

AN EXAMINATION OF PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ZAMBIA ARMY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2014-02

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE				Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 12-12-2014		2. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis		3. DATES COVERED (From - To) FEB 2014 – DEC 2014	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE An Examination of Professionalism in the Zambia Army				5a. CONTRACT NUMBER	
				5b. GRANT NUMBER	
				5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER	
6. AUTHOR(S) Major Innocent Chewe, Zambia Army				5d. PROJECT NUMBER	
				5e. TASK NUMBER	
				5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)				10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)	
				11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)	
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
14. ABSTRACT One of the keys to performing well at any job is professionalism. The purpose of this study was to examine the level of professionalism of the Zambia Army officer corps and explore the strategies that the Zambia Army has used to professionalize the Army since the country gained independence from Britain 50 years ago. The study looked at case studies of what countries like the United States did to professionalize its Army. Professional Military Education was the key that helped the US Army be professional and countries like Zambia can learn from such concepts. Zambia has military schools such as the Zambia Military Academy where officer cadets are trained. Officers of the ranks of majors and lieutenant colonels attend Staff College at the Zambia Defence Services Command and Staff College. However, incidents like the failed military coup of 1997 raised questions about the level of professionalism of Zambia's officers. Therefore, this study was conducted to identify information and strategies that can help increase the levels of professionalism of Zambia Army officers.					
15. SUBJECT TERMS Professionalism, Professional, Discipline, Character, Attitude, Competency, Conduct					
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT (U)	b. ABSTRACT (U)	c. THIS PAGE (U)			19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)
			(U)	110	

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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ABSTRACT

AN EXAMINATION OF PROFESSIONALISM IN THE ZAMBIA ARMY, by Major Innocent Chewe, Zambia Army, 110 pages.

One of the keys to performing well at any job is professionalism. The purpose of this study was to examine the level of professionalism of the Zambia Army officer corps and explore the strategies that the Zambia Army has used to professionalize the Army since the country gained independence from Britain 50 years ago. The study looked at case studies of what countries like the United States did to professionalize its Army. Professional Military Education was the key that helped the US Army be professional and countries like Zambia can learn from such concepts. Zambia has military schools such as the Zambia Military Academy where officer cadets are trained. Officers of the ranks of majors and lieutenant colonels attend Staff College at the Zambia Defence Services Command and Staff College. However, incidents like the failed military coup of 1997 raised questions about the level of professionalism of Zambia's officers. Therefore, this study was conducted to identify information and strategies that can help increase the levels of professionalism of Zambia Army officers.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, my sincere thanks goes to my thesis committee comprised of Mr. Albert Stahl as the chair, Mr. Mike McMurphy as second reader, and Dr. Kevin Shea as third reader. Without your unwavering guidance, this project could have not been accomplished.

Second, I wish to thank the members of the faculty of the US Army Command and General Staff College for the various useful insights shared with me.

Last, special thanks to my family and all respondents who answered my questions and therefore, helped me with data that made it possible to have this report made.

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ACRONYMS

DSCSC	Defense Services Command and Staff College
NCO	Non-commissioned Officer
PME	Professional Military Education
PROMEX	Promotion Examination
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
ZAF	Zambia Air Force
ZMA	Zambia Military Academy
ZNDF	Zambia National Defense Force
ZNS	Zambia National Service

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Even with the gifts of human understanding and professional competence arising from careful training, our military leader will not be complete without character, character which reflects inner strength and justified confidence in oneself.

— General Maxwell Taylor, *Leadership Statements and Quotes*

Background and History

The history of Zambia spans thousands of years. Zambia's population lives on lands that have been inhabited for many generations. Zambia's history can be broadly classified into four categories: the Early Stone Age, the Middle Stone Age, the Late Stone Age, and modern history.¹ Early Stone Age sites have been unearthed in many parts of Zambia, the most significant being at the Kalambo Falls in the northern part of Zambia and at Victoria Falls in the southern part of the country. There is evidence that primitive humans began to use fire systematically about 60,000 years ago. In addition, archeologists in Zambia unearthed the skull of Broken Hill Man; the skull is estimated to be 70,000 years old.²

The Middle Stone Age in Zambia can be traced back to 25,000 years ago.³ During this age, people began to manufacture tools for hunting purposes. They also discovered a

¹ Zambia Tourism, "About Zambia," Government of the Republic of Zambia, accessed 7 June 2014, <http://www.zambiatourism.com/about-zambia>.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

way to bury the dead. Most people lived in family groups near water. They sustained themselves by hunting and collecting wild fruits, honey, and tubers.⁴

The Late Stone Age in Zambia can be traced back to 15,000 years ago.⁵ During this period, people began to live in caves and rock shelters, the walls of which were decorated with paintings. Most of the paintings had ritual or religious meaning. It was during the Late Stone Age that the bow and arrow was invented. The bow and arrow revolutionized hunting and it gave humans a mechanical weapon of war and a method of starting fire. People of the Late Stone Age never tilled land or kept animals, but they survived by hunting and collecting wild fruits and honey.⁶

The modern history of Zambia can be traced back from the fifteenth century when Europeans arrived to trade in spices, slaves, and spread Christianity.⁷ By the year 1800, the British settlers arrived in Zambia. In 1857, David Livingstone, a Scottish doctor and ordained pastor, arrived in Zambia and became the first European to see the Mosi-O-Tunya Falls which was later re-named by the British as Victoria Falls. European settlement around the falls began in 1900. In 1888, Cecil Rhodes claimed the area of Zambia for the British Empire. By 1905, a railway line was built to ease the costs of trade. The European colonial settlers opted to settle in Zambia mainly because of the rich resources that they found there, such as minerals and timber.⁸ The British began mining

⁴ Zambia Tourism, "About Zambia."

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

activities in 1920. They also introduced English as Zambia's official language. On 24 October 1964, Zambia gained independence from the British rule.

Zambia has a unique geography. The name Zambia came from the Zambezi River, which rises in the northwest corner of the country and forms its southern boundary. Zambia is a landlocked country and lies between the latitudes ten and eighteen degrees south and longitudes twenty-two and thirty-three degrees east. Zambia is surrounded by eight neighboring countries: Democratic Republic of Congo to the north, Tanzania to the northeast, Malawi to the east, Mozambique to the southeast, Zimbabwe to the south, Botswana and Namibia to the southwest, and Angola to the west. Zambia's surface area is 752,000 square kilometers and makes it a big country slightly larger than Texas. The current population stands at fourteen million people.⁹ Zambia's vegetation is savannah type; most of the country's surface is flat with isolated small hills and underlying crystalline rocks. These rocks contain the bulk of Zambia's wealth in the form of minerals like copper, gold, uranium, cobalt, iron ore, zinc, and precious stones.¹⁰

Figure 1 shows the geographic location of Zambia and her surrounding neighbors.

⁹ The World Bank, "Zambia Population," accessed 30 October 2014, <http://www.worldbank.org/zambia/population>.

¹⁰ Zambia Tourism, "About Zambia."



Figure 1. Map of Africa

Source: Zambia Tourism, “About Zambia, Geography,” Government of the Republic of Zambia, accessed 7 June 2014, <http://www.zambiatourism.com/about-zambia/geography>.

The culture of Zambia is a blend of values and norms of more than 70 ethnically diverse people.¹¹ During the colonial period, economic interests brought ethnically different people from all the regions of Zambia into the urban areas that were industrialized. Industrialization and urbanization generated a new culture in Zambia. Western standards prevailed in urban areas. However, the rural inhabitants retained their indigenous and traditional customs and values. After independence, Zambia created institutions like the National Heritage Conservation Commission to protect and promote Zambia's culture. In this line, museums and cultural villages were established.¹²

In Zambia, Army barracks have names like Arakan, Burma, Chindwin, Kohima, Tug-Argan, Taungup, Gondar, and Kalewa. These names are not originally from Africa but from across the globe. To be specific, these names are from Asia where the Zambia Army soldiers fought alongside British troops in World War II. The Zambia Army has come a long way, from colonial times when the Army was called the Rhodesian Regiment, to modern times when the Zambia Army is a force to reckon with within the African continent.¹³

The birth of the Zambia Army can be traced to 24 October 1964 when Zambia obtained independence from Britain. The British Army Commander continued to command the Army until seven years later in 1971 when the first indigenous Zambian officer was appointed Army Commander. During that period, many Zambian officers

¹¹ Zambia Tourism, "About Zambia, History," Government of the Republic of Zambia, accessed 7 June 2014, <http://www.zambiatourism.com/about-zambia/history>.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Lungu Hanania and Ngoma Naison, *The Zambian Military-Trials, Tribulation and Hope* (Ndola: Mission Press, 2005), 314.

received military education from many overseas countries, the primary one being the United Kingdom (UK) at the Royal Military Academy. The Army leadership understood very well that the only way the Zambia Army was going to enhance professionalism was by investing in the education of young officers to lead the Zambian Army. Therefore, the Professional Military Education (PME) that Zambia Army officers received from overseas countries at independence contributed to the professionalization of the Zambia Army.¹⁴

At independence, Zambia inherited a small Army that could not match the magnitude of threats the country faced.¹⁵ The threats came from regimes in other Southern African countries that were not independent like Zambia. The white-settler regimes of South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Namibia were some of the threats that Zambia faced. In order to survive as a new nation, Zambia had to redesign and expand its Defense Force. The growth and expansion of the Zambia Army was very important to protect the country's sovereignty. Zambia embarked on a robust expansion program for its military since its Independence Day. New and more equipment was purchased coupled with unprecedented levels of personnel recruitment and training from Independence Day to 1980.¹⁶

¹⁴ Hanania and Naison, 318.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

The Zambia Army fought liberation wars against the colonial settlers in South Africa, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.¹⁷ The aim of these wars was to liberate other countries in the Southern African region. At home, the Army fought running battles to counter insurgencies that were waged by white-settler regimes mainly from South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe. Zambia hosted freedom fighters from the region including South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. The country also became the staging point for all liberation movements from the Southern African region.¹⁸ For this reason, the country became a major target by many formidable enemies like the South African apartheid regimes. After independence, the new Republic of Zambia and its young Army had to deal with aggression by numerically superior and better-equipped militaries of the white-settler regimes of Portuguese Angola and Mozambique, Britons in Zimbabwe, and the Boers in South Africa. The country had to survive through the traumatic era of independence struggles in the Southern African region. The Army underwent both growth and expansion to fight an insurgency that was fought in northwestern and eastern provinces of Zambia. The insurgents were trained and equipped by the apartheid South African regimes.¹⁹ The Zambia Army defeated the insurgents on home soil and South Africa finally became a democratic state in 1994. The

¹⁷ Ngoma Naison, *Prospects for a Security Community in Southern Africa* (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), 3.

¹⁸ Hanania and Naison. 321.

¹⁹ Ibid.

liberation struggles and insurgency that the country fought only served to mature and harden the Zambia Army.²⁰

Current Structure of the Zambia Army

The Zambia Army is an all-volunteer force. Energetic young men and women between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five are free to join the Army as long as they are healthy and have no criminal record.²¹ The current structure includes commissioned officers of the ranks of: generals, colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors, captains, lieutenants, second lieutenants and enlisted soldiers.²² Mandatory retirement age for all ranks in the Zambia Army is fifty-five years. At twenty years of service, anyone is free to retire from the Army with full pension benefits.²³

The educational system for the Zambia Army officers starts with eighteen months of officer cadet training at the Zambia Military Academy (ZMA). This is followed by specialized training and education by each Corps schools. An average of twelve months is dedicated to train young officers in various Army branches like Amour, Artillery, Engineers, Signals, Ordinance, Transport, and Infantry. This type of training is designed for Second Lieutenants on graduation from ZMA. When officers attain the rank of Captain, they undergo training and education for company commanders and squadron leaders. These programs run an average of six months. Officers are sponsored by the

²⁰ Hanania and Naison. 321.

²¹ Ibid., 318.

²² Zambia Army, *Nominal Roll* (Lusaka: Army Headquarters, 2013), 1-420.

²³ Zambia Army, Defense Act, CAP 131 (Lusaka: Army Headquarters, 1991), part 3.

Army to do further professional education with various universities and colleges both locally and abroad. Junior Command and Staff Course is a compulsory course that officers of the ranks of captain undergo as part of career progression before they can be eligible for promotion exams to the rank of major. majors and lieutenant colonels are eligible to attend the Senior Command and Staff Course at the Zambia Defense Services Command and Staff College (DSCSC) for a period of twelve months. DSCSC is affiliated with the University of Zambia (UNZA); therefore, officers do a parallel program with UNZA while attending the Senior Command and Staff Course. Successful candidates are awarded a diploma in Defense and Security Studies by UNZA in addition to the college certificate. After graduation from Staff College, officers can apply for a master's program in Defense Security Studies at UNZA.




Figure 2. Current Organizational Structure of the Zambia Army

Source: Created by author using Zambia Army doctrine.

Failed Military Coup Attempt

On 28 October 1997, Zambians woke up to a man who called himself Captain Solo (his real name is Captain Stephen Lungu) announcing on the national radio station that he had taken over the country and gave President Frederick Chiluba three hours to surrender himself or be killed.²⁴ He also announced he had dismissed all Service Chiefs.

The Army thwarted the coup within a few hours. The Zambia Army, unlike its

²⁴ Donald G. Mc Nail Jr., "Zambia says a Coup is over in 3 hours, Without Injury," *The New York Times*, 29 October 1997, accessed 7 June 2014, <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/29/world/Zambia>.

counterparts elsewhere in Africa, has been able to defeat efforts by disgruntled members of the military and population, as well as designs by other forces external to the country, to change the government through illegal means. The military coup failed due to commitment of the Zambian defense and security forces to democratic ideals.²⁵ However, this event sets in motion questions about professionalism in the Zambia Army, to be specific: why did Captain Stephen Lungu behave in an unprofessional manner?

The threat of political instability in the world is ever present. Zambia is not excluded from such a threat. The events of the October 1997 failed coup gave Zambia a wakeup call that the peace and tranquility that the country enjoyed since independence could be shattered within a short time. The events of political instability in some countries in the Southern African region have put strain on Zambia's security sector. The challenges of democracy and good governance are compounded when the military try to wrestle power from the elected government through a coup like that of Captain Solo.²⁶ Much of the debate and perhaps the policy choices regarding the military in Africa are about professionalism. Advocates of professionalism emphasize the need to attain stringent discipline in the areas of time management, doing more than the organization demands, becoming an expert in the field of work, mastering the art of effective communication, good bearing, the right attitude, practicing good manners and etiquettes.²⁷

²⁵ Hanania and Naison, 322.

²⁶ Naison, 4.

²⁷ The Goals Institute, *Professionalism is for Everyone: Five Keys to Being a True Professional* (USA: The Goals Institute, 2013), 5.

Professionalism and Democracy

The Zambia Army's role in a democratic nation is to uphold the tenets of democracy, and this is made possible by maintaining a professional officer corp.²⁸ During the period from the 1970s to the early 1990s, military performance was the result of the highly professional way, that the defense force carried out its tasks, despite being severely under resourced.²⁹ The Zambia Army and other security services responded professionally and successfully to the challenges when the country was faced with high security risks. The Army's adaptation to the reintroduction of multiparty democracy highlights the extent to which it has remained focused on its primary role of providing peace and security to Zambia, regardless of the political system. The presumed inverse relationship between professionalism and democracy has not been apparent in the Zambian case.³⁰ Just as much as the military in Zambia has maintained its professionalism over time, so has it also responded to the challenges of good governance, which demand a defense and security force that is both transparent and accountable.³¹

Problem Statement

The Zambia Army is facing challenges in the area of professionalism.³² The officers who are expected to lead the Zambia Army by example are now faced with many challenges in executing their duties. The creation of the ZMA and the DSCSC was meant

²⁸ Naison. 4.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Hanania and Naison, 321.

³¹ Ibid., 327.

³² Naison, 4.

to educate the officers and enhance professionalism. However, it is not clear whether professionalism has improved in the Army. In view of the above, this research was conducted with the view of establishing what the Zambia Army can do to increase current levels of professionalism. Action is needed if the Zambia Army has to increase the levels of professionalism.

Significance of Study

Since Zambia gained independence in 1964, the Zambia Army has learned to accept the fact that the onus to professionalize its Army rests solely on its officers. After independence, the support that the country received from its former colony, Britain went on decline. Therefore, the country had to look to its own human resource to professionalize government institutions that includes the Zambia Army.

Zambia is surrounded by eight neighboring countries some of which like Angola, Mozambique, and the Democratic Republic of Congo were once rocked by fierce civil wars. Therefore, Zambia's readiness to protect its territorial integrity cannot be over-emphasized looking at the geo-political landscape in which Zambia is located. This study is relevant and timely. It will help improve the Army and the country's civil security. The study is important because it seeks to redress the gap that exists in the historiography of officers' consciousness for professionalism in the Zambia Army. The study further investigates the evolution of military personnel's professional consciousness from 1964 when Zambia gained independence to 2014. A vibrant officer who is highly skilled and a master of the military arts and sciences may still be unprofessional. The Zambia Army is seen to be very professional, but the coming of new entrants into the Army seems to be diluting the exemplary efforts achieved by the previous intakes that are generally viewed

to be very professional.³³ In 2014, Zambia commemorates fifty years of independence; therefore, this study is significant to evaluate how the country has moved on the path to professionalize its institutions that include the Army during this period. The Zambia Army participates in various multi-national operations with other armies at international level; therefore, for the multi-national operations to be effective and efficient, professionalism of officers plays a center stage. The Army is expected to perform exceptionally well both locally and regionally when they participate in multinational environments.³⁴ The study is significant because it also offers pertinent recommendations on how the Zambia Army can best fulfil its vision of being a professional Army.

Research Questions

Primary Research Question

What can the Zambia Army do to increase the levels of education and professionalism?

Secondary Research Questions

1. What is the role of the Zambia Army?
2. How is the Army viewed by society in line with its role?
3. What can the Zambia Army do to increase the level of respect within society?
4. How do you rate the academic performance/discipline of the current generation of young officers compared to the older generation of officers?

³³ Hanania and Naison, 328.

³⁴ Ibid.

Methodology

This project is a qualitative research case study. Data for the study was collected from both primary and secondary sources. The primary research question was: what can the Zambia Army do to increase the levels of education and professionalism? In order to answer these primary and secondary questions this study used the qualitative methodology. Primary sources included oral interviews and Zambia Army official publications. Interviews were conducted with key policy makers of the Zambia Army via Skype and emails. For the respondents who were not available on Skype, questions were sent to them through email and their responses form part of the data collected. Ten interviewees were the sample size. The sampling procedure was purposive sampling. All interviewees were asked to share their experience with the Army and answer questions on professionalism. Secondary sources included published books, journals, and online information about the Zambia Army.

Assumptions

The assumption is that all those selected as key interviewees answered all the questions openly and honestly. Another assumption is that the transfer of Western concepts and theories into the Zambian set-up would be effective since the research and recommendations were based on Western literature review.

Limitations of the Study

A total of ten participants were used on this research project due to time constraints. The minimal number of participants/respondents limited the amount of qualitative data collected. This could be a threat to the validity of the study because data

was collected from a smaller sample size that was expected to give the right answers on behalf of the whole Zambia Army. Another limitation was that very little has been written to outline the guidelines for professionalism, specifically for the Zambia Army. To this effect, the study mostly utilized Western writers/concepts.

Definition of Terms

Attitude: Attitude is a person's mental outlook. Professionals have a professional approach and a positive, serving mentality. Professionals seek responsibility and are determined. Professionals are team players.³⁵

Character: Character is what defines a person and what he/she stands for. Professionals choose to be professional. Professionals have integrity and are responsible, diligent, and ethical. Professionals do what is right and project a professional image.³⁶

Competency: Competency is a person's degree of expertise. Professionals understand their job and develop their skills. Professionals produce results, perform effectively, and communicate skillfully.³⁷

Conduct: Conduct is how a person interacts with others. Professionals are mature, polite, and loyal. Professionals respect authority and maintain confidence. Professionals do everything with style and class.³⁸

³⁵ The Goals Institute, *Professionalism is for Everyone*, 5.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

Discipline. Discipline is training to act in accordance with established rules; accustoming to systematic and regular action.³⁹

Excellence: Excellence is a person's commitment to quality. Professionals press for excellence and continuous improvement. Professionals are attentive and follow instructions.⁴⁰

Profession: An occupation requiring special education.⁴¹

Professional: A professional is person who prosecutes anything professionally, or for a livelihood, and not in the character of an amateur.⁴² In this study, a professional is an officer who is an expert of his daily work, an officer who meticulously adheres to absolute courtesy, honesty, and responsibility in his dealings with his superiors and subordinates.

Professionalism in the Zambia Army: Everyone in the Zambia Army must uphold professionalism through discipline, handwork, integrity, and dedication to duty as key values on which a professional Army thrives.⁴³

³⁹ Merriam-Webster, "Discipline," accessed 30 October 2014, <http://www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/discipline>.

⁴⁰ The Goals Institute, *Professionalism is for Everyone*, 5.

⁴¹ Merriam-Webster, "Professional," accessed 30 October 2014, <http://www.webster-dictionary.org/definition/professional>.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ LTG Paul Mihova, Army Commander Zambia Army, "Welcoming Remarks," *Zambia Army Buffalo Magazine*, no. 2 (2012): 1.

Professionalism: Professionalism means the expertness characteristics of a professional person.⁴⁴ Professionalism is about ethics, quality work, and a quality attitude.

Summary

Chapter 1 explores the background and history of Zambia and the birth of the Zambia Army when the country gained independence from Britain in 1964. The chapter traces some of the main issues that the Army went through during liberation wars, and insurgencies that were waged in Southern Africa. At independence, Army officers received PME from many countries overseas like the UK at Sandhurst Royal Military Academy. From that point, professionalization of the Zambia Army was born. In addition, in 1971 the first indigenous Army commander was appointed and took over command from the Britons.⁴⁵

Zambia's political landscape evolved from a multiparty democracy to a one party system of government and back to a multiparty democracy. Despite these political changes, the Zambia Army upheld a high level of professionalism.⁴⁶ However, incidents like the failed attempted military coup of 1997 raised questions about the level of professionalism.

The next chapter will address the review of literature. The issue of professionalism in the Army has been a matter of concern among scholars and

⁴⁴ Merriam-Webster, "Professional."

⁴⁵ Hanania and Naison, 328.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

researchers globally.⁴⁷ Therefore, in order to make the evaluation of professionalism in the Zambia Army more reliable, a review of various literature and studies on similar subjects will be done. Various observed study reviews will not only be taken from Zambia, but also from other countries.

⁴⁷ B. J. Phiri, *A History of Indians in Eastern Province of Zambia* (Lusaka: High Quality Printers, 2000), 10.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Professionalism is the key to any job, but perhaps more so when it comes to the military. The nature of war itself, perhaps the most brutal and destructive force to mankind, requires that those who do fighting, do so with extreme levels of discipline, commitment, and skill. Such things are the essence of military professionalism.

— David Alfredo, “Define Military Professionalism”

The previous chapter established a brief historical perspective on the path taken by the Zambia Army officer corps relating to professionalism from 1964 when Zambia obtained independence from Britain. The information provided in the introduction is important because it lays a foundation of the issues relating to professionalism in the Zambia Army.

The literature review is organized into three parts. The first part reviews the contemporary works of authors who dealt with how professionalism was introduced in the French and US armies. Concepts about civil-military relations will also be covered. The next part of the literature review examines literature by colonial historians who argued that Africans could not be professionals at work. The last part of the literature review relates to the Zambia Army specifically.

Although many scholars have written on professionalism in the military, little scholarly attention has been given to professionalism in the African military. Most of the literature written is about the Zambia Defense Force, not specifically the Zambia Army. Zambia Defense Force is comprised of the Zambia Army, Zambia Air Force (ZAF) and Zambia National Service (ZNS). Literature written from many parts of the world on professionalism in the military is important because they relate to this study.

Contemporary Works

Origin of Professionalism in the French Army

Godfrey Parker discussed the development of professionalism in the military. In his work *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare*, he observed that during the French Revolution in 1794, the French created a radically new officer corps.⁴⁸ Parker further noted that the flight of officers from the old Royal Army left so many vacancies that they could only be filled by rapidly promoting non-commissioned officers (NOCs) into the commissioned ranks. Volunteer battalions elected their own officers. Some officers were promoted with meteoric speed, but overall the officer corps became more and more professional.⁴⁹ We can learn from Parker's work that the Napoleonic wars brought about professionalism of the military. Officers were carefully selected and given Professional Military Education (PME). The army recruited the best young men of that time to lead a motivated army that was in a revolution that made soldiers fight for liberty, equality and fraternity. During the Napoleonic wars, officers became more professional. Seniority and talent determined promotion.⁵⁰ Parker's work is a general study that accounts for the Western warfare from ancient times to the present day. The study examines historical aspects of the development of warfare on land, sea and air, weapons and technology, strategy and defense, discipline and intelligence, mercenaries and standing armies, cavalry and infantry, guerilla assault, and nuclear arsenal. The works

⁴⁸ Geoffrey Parker, *The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare* (Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 193.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

also examine the key events in the history of armed engagement, from the Greek victory, through to the introduction of gunpowder in medieval England and France to, the jungle warfare of Vietnam and the strategic air attacks of the Gulf War. However, Parker's study does not address how professionalism can be enhanced in the military, and more specifically in Zambia. Nonetheless, the study is important because it informs our study that the Napoleonic wars were characterized by professionalism in order to defeat enemy armies, and this constitutes the core issue investigated in our study.

Origin of Professionalism in the United States Army

In her book, *Military Education and the Emerging Middle Class in the Old South*, Jennifer R. Green argues that military education was an important institution in the development of the southern middle class as a regional group and a part of the national middle class in the late nineteenth century in the United States. She concluded that class formation, professionalization, and social mobility in the 1840s and 1850s, through military education, defined the middle class on a national level and identified the regionally specific characteristics of the emerging southern middle class.⁵¹ She further concluded that military schools were used to advantage to educate the non-elite young men in the old south, families sent their sons off to be cadets.⁵² She documented that the first military school in the southern United States was founded in 1839: the Virginia Military Institute.⁵³ She observed that graduate networks and the professionalization of

⁵¹ Jennifer R. Green, *Military Education and the Emerging Middle Class in the Old South* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 2.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

teaching mirrored nationwide trends, provided evidence of the start of modern bureaucratic and professional development in the old south. The south changed significantly during the late antebellum years, as did the entire nation.⁵⁴ In her writings, she emphasized the importance of military education to professionalize the military. In her own words:

The study of military education, a significant form of higher schooling in the old south, is in and of itself important to the history of education and social institutions. Moreover, because military schools and their alumni demonstrated many trends of the era, including modernization and professionalization, the study of antebellum military education in the south also allows us to analyze the emerging southern middle class, especially its education, mobility, and professionalization. The possibilities of southern middle-class development could not be realized in the few decades that southern military schools remained in operation. The study of military education thus both illuminates the emerging middle class and illustrates the increasingly important role education played in southern social structures.⁵⁵

Green's research is important to this research project. This study will rest on the shoulders of this work that argues that PME is key to increasing military professionalization and modernization.

Timothy K. Nenninger examined professionalism, education, and the art of war in the nineteenth century and what the US Army did to cope with technological, organizational, and tactical changes that occurred in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. He argued that in order for the US Army to cope with the trends of that time, it needed educated, well-trained, professional officers.⁵⁶ In 1881, the War

⁵⁴ Green, 2.

⁵⁵ Ibid., 13.

⁵⁶ Timothy K. Nenninger, *The Leavenworth Schools and the old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881-1918* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1978), 3.

Department established the School of Application for Cavalry and Infantry at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, as a training school for officers.⁵⁷ The college was later renamed US Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC). Nenninger observed that the American Army learned from foreign armies like the Germans.⁵⁸ The principal European staff college that Americans learned from is The Victorian Army and Staff College.⁵⁹ The Victorian Staff College has a full-fledged history. Nenninger further observed that emphasis on professionalism was placed on leader education and leader development programs in the US Army. Nenninger's works are important to this proposed study because he establishes the context within which staff colleges emerged. Although Nenninger confined his study to staff colleges in the United States, the study is important because the issues raised touch on some of the issues tackled by our study.

Morris Janowitz in his book, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* examined and placed into perspective the agonies of prolonged hostilities in Vietnam. He argued that for the people to join the Army it required a transformation of both civilian control and internal professionalization. Janowitz argues that the military profession consists of a mixture of heroic leaders, military managers, and technical specialists; and one officer can come to embody various mixtures of these elements.⁶⁰ He

⁵⁷ Nenninger, 3.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 13.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1964), 425.

further observed that the military could not be transformed into a large-scale civilian organization even during the period of most intensive civilization the World War II.

Additionally, he noted that although the military had to respond selectively to the civilian influence after World War II, it has consciously sought to limit civilian influence by defending prerogatives, which it believed were crucial. Above all else, all three services trained officers at the service academies and to maintain a strong emphasis on the importance of academic training as a route to elite positions.⁶¹ Janowitz argued that the academy system is based on the notion that an early decision to become a career officer, plus four years of military academy education, would produce strong commitments to the military establishment.⁶² The work by Janowitz put emphasis on PME to the professionalization of the Army and civil-military relations. He sighted the Vietnam War where military authorities had to face hostile public opinion in the United States and extensive disaffection with military service among young people. The mass media highlighted dramatic antiwar incidents both in and around military bases. For the first time the armed forces had to cope with a persistent and politically organized antiwar movement within their own ranks, and this movement, regardless of its limited size, attracted considerable attention.⁶³

On professional requirements and motivation, Janowitz argues that to meet continuous dilemmas, the officer corps needs to redefine its professional requirements. He noted that in the short term, the military profession, like other public service careers,

⁶¹ Janowitz, 425.

⁶² *Ibid.*, xiv.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, xx.

becomes more effective as salaries are raised.⁶⁴ Further, he noted that it remained an open question whether a political democracy should have a constabulary force motivated purely by monetary incentives.⁶⁵ Consequently, he wondered whether the military establishment, like other public agencies, could maintain its organizational effectiveness merely by raising monetary rewards, and by making the conditions of employment approach those found in civilian enterprise.⁶⁶ He further observed that monetary rewards might work most effectively for those officers engaged as military technologists.⁶⁷ According to Janowitz, even if salaries were to become competitive, the incentive system would not necessarily produce the required perspectives and professional commitments. Men can be motivated by money to undertake dangerous and irksome tasks, but the result would be to weaken essential heroic tradition.⁶⁸ Janowitz's work is quite significant as the issues it raised such as internal tensions concerning authority, civil-military relations, motivation, doctrine and PME were also be examined in our study.

In his work, *The West Point Candidate Book*, William L. Smallwood highlighted many important issues that candidates need to know to prepare for West Point, how to gain admission to the US Military Academy and how to survive after they get there. In

⁶⁴ Janowitz, 422.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 421.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 422.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

1802, Congress established the US Military Academy.⁶⁹ The mission of the academy was to train officers who would also be engineers for the Army—a goal George Washington had long advocated because of the desperate shortage of engineers his Army had suffered during the war.⁷⁰ West Point became the first military and engineering school in the United States. However, its academic standards for the first fifteen years were very loose and the quality of its graduates was lacking.⁷¹ Smallwood observed that the academic program improved after 1817, when Colonel Sylvanus Thayer became Superintendent of the Academy. Thayer immediately initiated changes that strengthened the academic standards. Included in his program were two new requirements: (1) every cadet would recite every day in every class; and (2) no class size would contain more than fifteen cadets.⁷² Smallwood observed that the small size class enabled instructors to quiz each cadet and thereby hold each of them accountable for every assignment.⁷³ He also observed that about one out of every three who enroll at West Point fail to survive, and according to statistics, primarily one-third who go there are unprepared mentally.⁷⁴ To address the issue of mental preparedness, Smallwood asked questions on what motivation someone needed to succeed at West Point.

⁶⁹ William M. Smallwood, *The West Point Candidate Book* (Mesa, AZ: Beacon Books, 1990), 2.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 38.

The author discovered that first, any candidate who would succeed at West Point must decide by himself/herself to join the Army. He observed that candidates who were forced by parents to join the Army had the highest rates of dropping out of the academy.⁷⁵ Second, Smallwood observed that candidates who succeed at West Point know the reason why they opt to join the Army. He observed that candidates who joined the Army for glamour and prestige had a higher rate of dropping out of West Point. He said candidates must be prepared to undergo a challenging four-year officer training and earn a college degree in the process. Third, Smallwood advise candidates to acquire some basic knowledge about the Army before applying to West Point. Fourth, the author observed that for a candidate to succeed at West Point he/she must be a determined person. He further observed that those people who give up when they pass through difficult challenges in life are likely to give up once they go to West Point.⁷⁶

Smallwood also highlighted that cadets at West Point are expected to live with the honor code. A cadet will not lie, cheat, or steal, nor tolerate those who do.⁷⁷ He also noted that women were first admitted to West Point in 1976. Since that time, they have made up about 10 percent of each entering class.⁷⁸ This study is important because it reflected on pertinent issues, which form part of our study that hinges on the recruitment process, and the cadets training at ZMA.

⁷⁵ Smallwood, 39.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 48.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 203.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 209.

Concepts on Civil-Military Relations

Two opposing concepts about civil-military relations have been identified. Samuel P. Huntington who argued that professionalism lessens political influence championed the first concept. Morris Janowitz who argued that professionalism increases political influence championed the opposing concept.

Professionalism Lessens Political Influence Theory

Samuel P. Huntington argues in his book *The Soldier and the State*, that professionalism limits the military's political influence. Huntington argues that subjective civilian control ensures that the military's responsiveness to civilian authority, detracts from the military's effectiveness at protecting the nation. Because its goal is to maximize the power of civilian groups in relation to the military, subjective control minimizes the power of the military by civilianizing it, and creates a military that mirrors the conflicting values of many civilian interest groups.⁷⁹ Huntington further argued that it is better to establish objective civilian control, which militarizes the military, separates military and civilian concerns, and thus maximizes both military responsiveness and effectiveness.⁸⁰ According to Huntington, the key to objective civilian control is professionalism. He defines professionalism in the context of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. According to Huntington's definition, professional officers should never intervene in politics, because officers would lose their professionalism by involving themselves in politics. He sighted an example of German officers whom he said lost professionalism

⁷⁹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 80.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

when they either assumed political roles or adopted Nazi views and opposed Hitler's policies.⁸¹ Huntington further argues that as professionalism increases, the complex skills required by the military to master their vocation will also increase, thereby consuming the overwhelming portion of their time and satisfying all their occupational needs. Thus, the interest of the armed forces is restricted purely to military concerns.⁸²

Professionalism Increases Political Influence Theory

Contrary to Huntington who argued that the military must just focus on military issues, Morris Janowitz gave an opposing view to say the military must be sensitive to nonmilitary considerations.⁸³ Janowitz argued that after World War II, social and technological changes affected both international relations and military institutions. Thus, it was difficult to distinguish the military and civilian skills because the two have become very similar; thus, it was difficult to distinguish between military and political action. Therefore, it was very important for the military to be sensitive to nonmilitary considerations, and the civilians to be sensitive to military considerations and allow the military to share in the formation of government policy.⁸⁴ Janowitz challenges Huntington's theory that professionalism will limit the military from political involvement.

⁸¹ Huntington, 121.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Janowitz, 10.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

In his book, *Military Professionalization and Political Power*, Bengt Abrahamsson challenges Huntington's theory and uses the same line of thinking as Janowitz. He argued that a highly professionalized military is just like any other professional organization because both entities are concerned with goal seeking, growth, improvement, and survival.⁸⁵ He argued that military leaders are professional and therefore, they have a responsibility to urge government leaders to accept their professional judgment. He analyzed that the greater the level of professionalism, the greater the probability that the military will be politicized. Abrahamsson further argued that a professional military is highly active and a motivated group with strong political views. Huntington and Janowitz's/Abrahamson's opposing theories on professionalism in the military are important to this study because they bring out concepts that this study investigated about the Zambian civil-military relations.

All Workers Must Be Professional

The Goals Institute in the book *Professionalism is for Everyone* argues that it does not matter which career one is in, because professionalism is meant for everybody who goes for work without categorizing the working groups. The authors of the book argue that being professional does not guarantee that after getting the biggest office that everybody will respect you. However, they identify two factors that are associated with people who are professionals. First, professionals are confident of whom they are, and second, they are proud to abide by the work ethics of what they do.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Bengt Abrahamsson, *Military Professionalization and Political Power* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1972), 17.

⁸⁶ The Goals Institute, *Professionalism is for Everyone*, 1.

The book further argues that professionals always put more effort into their work, more than what is expected of them. Regardless of the job description, every job can be performed in a professional manner. The study further identifies that professionals have integrity. Professionals are honest, truthful, and trustworthy. Professionals take responsibility for their actions. Professionals are people who are experts at their work; they do everything in a stipulated period. They admit when they are wrong, they keep their words, and deliver what is expected of them on time.⁸⁷

The study by The Goals Institute is important as it covers the concepts about professionalism invested by this study. The characteristics that make up professional workers including officers were covered by the above study. This research case study is built on concepts that professional officers will take responsibility for their actions, become experts in their field of work, and be timely in the execution of their duties.

Colonial Scholars on Professionalism in African Military

Colonial scholars were also attracted to the continent during the twentieth century and they wrote on many issues surrounding the African workers. Notably among the colonial scholars were historians like Lewis H. Gann, Charles Van Onselen, J Hooker, and Peter Duignan who did research work in Southern Africa. These historians denied that an African was a worker. They argued that an African was not good at work because he was always attached to his home village and never concentrated on his work. They argued that an African migrant could not be considered as working class because an African worker had one foot in the industrial world and another in the rural setting. This

⁸⁷ The Goals Institute, *Professionalism is for Everyone*, 14.

differentiated the African worker from his European counterpart who was recognized as a true worker.⁸⁸ Consequently, these colonial scholars concluded that African workers did not qualify to be considered as workers and lacked consciousness even though they were exploited.⁸⁹

Colonial scholars argued that Africans voluntarily migrated to urban areas not to go and really work, but to go work in order to make money, to buy clothes, to pay bride price, buy gifts for their relatives, and other things that their communities did not produce.⁹⁰

The theories of Charles Lewis H. Gann, Charles Van Onselen, J. Hooker, and Peter Duignan reveal considerable disagreement on how to look at Africans in terms of professionalism. This study will distance itself from colonial studies that sought to demonstrate that an African could not be professional. Colonial studies had many limitations. First, they relied heavily on colonial resources. Second, they equated worker consciousness with organized labor. Therefore, the studies depicted African worker consciousness from the perspective of the employer instead of the experiences of the workers themselves. Third, colonial scholars were writing for their colonial Masters. Therefore, they depicted the African worker as powerless and devoid of self-awareness. This study seeks to put an officer in an African country at the center of its analysis to

⁸⁸ Lewis H. Gann, *A History of Northern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1953* (New York: Humanities Press, 1956), 102.

⁸⁹ Charles Van Onselen, "Worker Consciousness in Black Mines: Southern Rhodesia, 1900-1920," *Journal of African History* 14, no. 2 (1973): 237.

⁹⁰ Patrick Harries, *Work, Culture and Identity: Migrant Laborers in Mozambique and South Africa-1860-1910* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1994), 226.

show him that he is not a victim of colonial policies but as a creator of his destiny and history.

John Iliffe challenged the views of colonial historians in the 1970s. Iliffe's work on the Tanzanian workers from 1929 to 1950 indicated that African workers exhibited group consciousness and they created labor organizations themselves.⁹¹ Iliffe observed that African workers exhibited a strong sense of consciousness and they acted together in unity to advance their common interests. "This growing consciousness enables them to act more effectively. And shared experience of successful action in return intensifies group consciousness."⁹²

This study benefits from the insights by Iliffe as his work seeks to show that African consciousness for work developed in the Zambia Army even before independence. The study builds on Iliffe's work by capturing the actual experiences of officers with regard to professionalism since Zambia obtained independence.

The British Influence Over the Zambia Army

Zambia gained its independence from the British rule in 1964. Even after independence, the Zambia Army continued to employ British officers as Army Commander. It was only in 1971 when the first indigenous Zambian officer was appointed as Zambia Army Commander. The period between 1964 and 1971 saw the British Government sponsor many Zambian officers to receive PME from the Royal Military Academy in the UK. Back home in Zambia, the British officers trained the

⁹¹ John Iliffe, *The Creation of Group Consciousness Among the Dockworkers of Dar es Salaam 1929-50* (London: Longman, 1975), 49.

⁹² Ibid., 50.

Zambian officers in subjects such as Military Law and Leadership as enshrined in the Zambian constitution, which took most of its style from the British system. The British Government offered both financial and technical assistance to Zambia to set up military institutions in the country. Such institutions include the ZMA that trains officer cadets, the Military Establishment of Zambia that has various Army schools that trains both officers and soldiers from basic courses to officers' course at the level of Junior Command and Staff Course (company level course). The British Government was also instrumental in the facilitation of the establishment of the DSCSC. The British Government has greatly contributed to the professionalization of the Zambia Army.⁹³ The study by Naison is very important to this thesis because it gives an in-depth look into the role the British Government played to professionalize the Zambia Army. This study benefitted from his analytical understanding of the important role played by the former colonial master of Zambia. Therefore, Zambia's quest to professionalize its Army can therefore not be complete without acknowledging the crucial role played by Britain.

Professionalism in the Zambia Army

Hanania Lungu and Naison Ngoma in their work *The Zambian Military-Trials, Tribulations and Hope*, examined the importance of the Zambian military in the history of Zambia. They reflected on the problems the military encountered and how it survived. They argued that in the case of Zambia, the military reflected its trials, tribulations, and hopes.⁹⁴ The study highlighted the major issues that the military in Zambia went through

⁹³ Hanania and Naison, 318.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 313.

during the liberation wars and insurgencies that were waged in Southern African region.

Lungu and Ngoma argued that professional military training in Zambia began at

independence time:

In line with its pre-independence declared policy of non-alignment, Zambia procured military equipment from various countries including Britain, Italy, Yugoslavia, India, China and the Soviet Union. Some countries, which were sympathetic to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, such as China, even donated equipment to Zambia. Officers and men were sent abroad for training in such countries as Britain, Canada, Italy, Yugoslavia, India, the Soviet Union, China and Pakistan. Likewise, training teams from some of these countries were contracted to train Zambians locally. Several training institutions were established, which then meant that training abroad was minimized.⁹⁵

Among the training institutions that were formed in the Zambia Army is the ZMA, a training center for Officer Cadets. The other one is DSCSC, which offers the highest PME in Zambia. The Government of the Republic of Zambia established military schools like the ZMA to educate the military personnel. Prior to establishing these military schools, officers were sent overseas to receive their training and education. ZMA was established shortly after independence, but it was not until 1995 that the higher military learning institution, DSCSC was established. The cost of sending officers abroad for PME was financially too much for a young Zambia Army. The government saw it necessary to establish DSCSC, the highest military learning institution to cut down on money spent to train officers abroad and to speed up the professionalization process of the Army officers. The establishment of ZMA and DSCSC were aimed at empowering the Army with tools for professionalism. Preferably, it was expected that the

⁹⁵ Hanania and Naison, 319.

establishment of these institutions would make the Army more effective and efficient in carrying out its roles.⁹⁶

Lungu and Ngoma further argued that the Zambian military was kept on continuous operational duties until 1994 when South Africa finally became a democratic state.⁹⁷ They also observed that the aggressive attacks by South Africa's infamous race units, Rhodesia's 'D' Squadron, Special Air Services, and Selous Scouts complemented by their regular army and air force units, only served to mature and harden the Zambia military.⁹⁸ The two scholars argued that the Zambian military matured fast after independence because of the rapid recruitment and PME that the officers received from overseas countries like Britain.

From independence, the Zambia Army has been known to be a professional Army and has participated in many international peacekeeping missions under the mandate of the United Nations (UN) and African Union.⁹⁹ The officers who were commissioned in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s are highly respected for being professional and very loyal to the military and political system.¹⁰⁰ These senior officers are very mindful of time, discipline, and uphold military traditions that have been handed over from generation to generation. On dressing, the senior intakes dress like gentlemen and ladies, unlike the

⁹⁶ Hanania and Naison, 319.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 321.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ United Nations, "United Nations Peace Operations," accessed 7 June 2014, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/zambia>.

¹⁰⁰ Hanania and Naison, 328.

newer intakes who dress more like pop-stars in most cases. The newer intakes seem to be too busy to uphold such traditions like spending time with troops, they seem to be too busy with their laptops, tablets, and iPads surfing the internet on social networks like Facebook during working hours. In the recent past, newer officers like Captain Solo have shown a degree of unprofessional tendencies, as compared to the senior intakes that were very loyal to the political and military system.

The Zambia Army Commander's vision is to command a professional and motivated Army that is accountable to itself and the people of Zambia.¹⁰¹ For the Zambian officer to be seen as professional Lieutenant General Paul Mihova stated in his speech, as quoted in the *Zambia Army Buffalo Magazine* that everybody in the Zambia Army must uphold professionalism through discipline, handwork, integrity, and dedication to duty as key values on which a professional Army thrives.¹⁰² The general's speech underlined the need for the Zambia Army military personnel to strive to maintain discipline, hard work, integrity, and dedication to duty as the key elements to professionalism.

Samuel Huntington, a political scientist, presented a military officer as a professional man worthy of the same respect the public gives to civilian professionals.¹⁰³ This is applicable in the case of Zambia, a country with a rich civil-military history. The political landscape changed over time and the Zambia Army had to adapt to different systems of governance. First, between 1964 and 1973 the country had a multi-party

¹⁰¹ Mihova, 1.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Huntington, 14.

system of government. From 1973 to 1991, the country adopted a single party system of government where Army officers were given political appointments as District Governors. From 1991 to date, the country adopted a multiparty democracy as the primary form of government.

In 1976, the country adopted a unified command where Service Chiefs reported to the Commander of the Zambia National Defense Force (ZNDF). However, the ZAF and ZNS abolished the system in 1980 mainly due to resentment and rejection of the ZNDF. ZNS was used to train the largest number of Zambians for military duty in response to the military threat arising out of the liberation wars in the neighboring countries.¹⁰⁴ The main issue why ZAF and ZNS did not support the concept of unified command was that Army officers filled most senior appointments in the ZNDF.¹⁰⁵ After the ZNDF was disbanded the country reverted to the command system inherited at independence where Service Chiefs report through the Minister of Defense to the President who is the Commander-in-Chief.

What is unique about the Zambian system is that the Army remained steadfast, despite the many changes in the political landscape and command structures. The Zambia Army maintained a high level of professionalism.¹⁰⁶ The works by Lungu and Ngoma and the messages from the Zambia Army Commander are important because they relate to the issues investigated by this study.

¹⁰⁴ Phiri, 8.

¹⁰⁵ Hanania and Naison, 320.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

Roles of the Zambia Army

The roles of the Zambia Army include the following:

1. To defend the territorial integrity of Zambia from both external and internal aggression.
2. To restore law and order in areas where internal security is threatened.
3. To come to the aid of civil authorities in times of need.
4. To provide troops for various UN and African Union operations as and when called upon.¹⁰⁷

Zambia Army Participation in International Peacekeeping Missions

The Zambia Army has been an active participant in the UN and African Union peacekeeping missions globally. The Army has participated in peacekeeping operations and observer missions in countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Iran-Iraq, Ivory Coast, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Ethiopia-Eritrea, Kosovo, Lebanon, Nepal, and Darfur.¹⁰⁸ Zambia's legacy in international peacekeeping missions is well documented. The officers and soldiers of the Zambia Army have performed very professionally in all the international missions. The best example where the legacy of the Zambia Army is well talked about was the UN mission in Sierra Leone. The Zambia Army defied all odds and deployed to the Tongo Fields that was the headquarters for Revolutionary United Front rebels. The Sierra Leone mission was special to the Zambia Army in many ways. First, many nations were unwilling to deploy

¹⁰⁷ Zambia Army, *Official Diary* (Lusaka: Army Headquarters, 2014), 1.

¹⁰⁸ United Nations, "United Nations Peace Operations."

there because they would have risked their troops in the hands of the ruthless Revolutionary United Front rebels. Second, the Zambia Army deployed into Tongo Fields and disarmed the rebels; this was a sign of a professional and robust Army. When the Zambia Army personnel come back from such international engagements, their level of professionalism, experience, and expertise is enhanced.¹⁰⁹

The Role of the Zambia Army in Southern African Region

The Zambia Army has specific roles to play in the Southern African region. Southern African Development Community is a regional body for Southern African countries. The organization handles among other tasks economic and security matters of member countries. Zambia is a member State, and actively involved with the Inter-State Defense and Security Committee. Zambia's roles under the Inter-State Defense and Security Committee ISDSC are:

- a. Prevention of aggression from within the region and from outside the region.
- b. Prevention of coups d'état.
- c. Management and resolution of conflicts.
- d. Promotion of regional stability.
- e. Promotion of regional peace.
- f. Promotion and enhancement of regional development.¹¹⁰

How Long it Takes for Somebody to Become a Professional

Much of the debate surrounding the topic of professionalism is how long it takes someone to become a professional. Daniel J. Levitin argued this topic in his works *This is Your Brain on Music: The Science of Human Obsession*. Levitin argues that it takes

¹⁰⁹ Hanania and Naison, 328.

¹¹⁰ Naison, 131.

somebody 10,000 hours to get mastery.¹¹¹ To support the works of Levitin, Malcom Gladwell in his book, *The Story of Success* also agreed that it takes time to reach professionalism in any field. Gladwell argues that the best and brightest, the most famous and most successful people spend a lot of time to attain expertise in their fields.¹¹² He explains that the secrets of software billionaires, great soccer players, scientists, and entertainers all devote more time to what they do. He argues that the 10,000 rule applies to all areas of expertise. Gladwell takes us on an intellectual journey that supports the old adage that practice makes perfect. He argues that all the successful people in this world take many hours of practice to master a skill. Works by both Gladwell and Levitin were important to this study because they hinged on the issues investigated by this study regarding the training duration of officers in Zambia.

Qualitative Research

Researchers who dealt extensively with qualitative research projects guided this research. The following four researchers dealt comprehensively with qualitative research in their projects, and their works were important to this study.

Dr. Kevin Peter Shea in his dissertation for Doctor of Education entitled “The Effects of Combat related Stress on Learning in an Academic Environment: A Qualitative Study,” observed that researchers use qualitative research to explore and understand

¹¹¹ Daniel J Levitin, *This is Your Brain on Music: The Science of Human Obsession* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), 197.

¹¹² Malcom Gladwell, *The Story of Success* (New York: Little Brown and Company, Hachete Book Group, 2008), 288.

societal issues.¹¹³ This study was guided by the idea that to understand the issues surrounding professionalism in the Zambia Army the research needed to look at additional issues like civil-military relations, the role of the Zambia Army, and how the civil society looked at the Zambia Army.

Sharan B. Merriam, in her book *Qualitative Research and Case Study Applications in Education*, dealt with the qualitative research process. She argued that qualitative researchers are interested in understanding and making sense of people's experiences.¹¹⁴ The study by Merriam was important because this project focused on getting information from officers, who shared their experiences about the Zambia Army and gave their opinions on how they understood the subject of professionalism of officers. Merriam also stated in her works that qualitative research reveals how all the parts work together to form a whole.¹¹⁵ This idea was important to this study because to understand the subject of professionalism in the Zambia Army, we needed to put together many aspects like systems of governance, democracy, role of the Army and civil-military relations. All these components make one system and make us to understand many parts that play a key role in professionalism of officers.

John W. Creswell in his work, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design, Choosing among Five Traditions* also dealt with qualitative research designs. Creswell

¹¹³ Kevin Peter Shea, "The Effects of Combat related Stress on Learning in an Academic Environment: A Qualitative Study" (Ph.D. diss., Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, 2010), 56.

¹¹⁴ Sharan B. Merriam, *Qualitative Research and Case Study Applications in Education* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1998), 6.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

argues that qualitative research is an inquiry process to explore and understand social or human problems.¹¹⁶ He also discussed the coding system during data analysis. He observed that open coding is used by a researcher to form categories of information about the phenomenon being studied.¹¹⁷ This study benefited from this idea because it used open coding in data analysis.

Jack R. Fraenkel and Norman E. Wallen also dealt with qualitative research methodologies in their book, *How to Design and Evaluate Research in Education*. The authors looked at the specifics, techniques, and procedures that researchers should follow in conducting research and how to report the results. The authors argue that researchers use purposive sampling because they want to target a specific population that they think has the necessary previous knowledge on the specific subject being investigated.¹¹⁸ This idea was important to this study because it used purposive sampling to select the population for sampling. Only officers who were viewed to have had the necessary knowledge on professionalism were target for sampling.

Summary

Professionalism in the military has evolved. From the French Revolution era, through the introduction of PME in the US Army in the nineteenth century, and continuing into the Zambia Army from the day the country gained independence from

¹¹⁶ John W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design, Choosing among Five Traditions* (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 1998), 15.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 57.

¹¹⁸ Jack R. Fraenkel and Norman E. Wallen, *How to Design and Evaluate Research in Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 100.

Britain in 1964. PME is the key to making a professional officer. A professional officer is educated in military profession, culture, values, and ethics.

Two opposing theories about professionalism in military have been identified in civil-military relations. The first theory argues that professionalism lessens political influence, and the second one argues that professionalism increases political influence theory. Huntington and Janowitz extensively dealt with these theories. These theories are important because they affect the civil-military relationship investigated in this study.

The works of researchers who dealt with qualitative research guided this study. These researchers included Dr. Kevin Peter Shea, John W. Creswell, Sharan B. Merriam, Jack R. Fraenkel, and Norman E. Wallen.

The following chapter of this study, chapter 3, is methodology. The methodology used in this study involved collection of data from both primary and secondary sources. This study used the qualitative methodology.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The primary research question is: what can the Zambia Army do to increase the levels of education and professionalism? The previous chapter looked at the literature available to answer the research question. This chapter addresses the methodology used to answer the research questions. This study used the qualitative methodology.

Reasons for Choosing a Qualitative Research Methodology

In other words, the methodology used in this study was about words and not numbers. The basis for choosing a qualitative research methodology was motivated by the researcher's interest to hear and understand the experiences of Zambian officers; how they felt about professionalism, and how they make meaning of issues affecting them in this world.¹¹⁹ The purpose of this study was to explore what the Zambia Army can do to increase the levels of professionalism. Chapter 3 is organized into three parts. It recaps the introduction to the study; second, the methodology used in data collection; and third, data analysis.

The introduction to the study offers a brief background and history of Zambia as a nation and the Zambia Army. The chapter described how the Zambia Army moved on the path to professionalize the Army and highlighted the type and duration of military training that officers go through in their career. This was important as it established the foundation of the issues that affected the values and attitudes of junior officers of the Zambia Army with regard to professionalism.

¹¹⁹ Merriam, 6.

Data Collection

To find answers to the primary and secondary questions, this study collected data that can be categorized broadly into two groups: primary and secondary. The primary research method was the oral interviews with key Zambia Army officers as well as reviewing official Zambia Army publications and UN reports. The interviewees were asked to share their experience with the Zambia Army. The names of the officers who were interviewed have been withheld by mutual agreement.¹²⁰ All the interview questions were answered by the officers. These primary sources validated the current state of professionalism in the Zambia Army and suggested what can be done to increase those levels.

Purposive Sampling

Purposive sampling was used to select Zambian Army officers for the study because of who they are and what they know, rather than selecting respondents by chance.¹²¹ Purposeful sampling was used because the study only needed information from officers who already knew what was happening in the Zambia Army with respect to professionalism.¹²² The study involved ten interviewees. The interviewees were asked

¹²⁰ Kate L. Turabian, *A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*, 8th ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 258.

¹²¹ Matthew B. Miles and Michael Huberman, *Qualitative Data Analysis* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd., 1984), 27.

¹²² Fraenkel and Wallen, 100.

open-ended questions. According to Merriam, the first task in conducting a qualitative case study is to ask questions that perplex and challenge the mind.¹²³

Data was collected until the study reached the point of saturation when no further new information was received from the interviewees.¹²⁴ In order to protect the research participants, an Informed Consent Form was sent to each one to read and sign. All the research participants were informed that their participation was voluntary and that they were free at any time to withdraw their consent and stop participation without any penalty or loss of benefits.

Secondary research sources were drawn from the published literature, journals, and online information about the Zambia Army. In order to evaluate the level of professionalism in the Zambia Army and what can be done to increase those levels, this study focused on the following secondary questions:

1. What is the role of the Zambia Army?
2. How is the Army viewed by society in line with its role?
3. What can the Zambia Army do to increase the level of respect within society?
4. How do you rate the impact of alcoholism on the officers' corps?
5. How do you rate the academic performance/discipline of the current generation of young officers compared to the older generation of officers?

¹²³ Merriam, 57.

¹²⁴ Miles and Huberman, 74.

Data Analysis

After the data was collected, the data was subjected to qualitative analysis before assembly. Data analysis for this study used an interactive, cyclical process that evolved from data collection, data reduction, data display, coding, and conclusions.¹²⁵ The method also sought to achieve saturation given the idea of purposeful sampling.

Open Coding/Themes

This research used open coding. John W. Creswell in his book, *Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design, Choosing among Five Traditions*, referred to open coding as a data analysis process where the researcher forms categories of information about the phenomenon being studied by grouping that information into common themes.¹²⁶ From the raw data that was collected from the interviewees and literature review, it was very clear to see the main ideas that everybody was trying to put across. All the key ideas, concepts, and themes were identified, examined, and referenced. This helped to label the data into manageable and identical chunks. Data was then re-arranged into an appropriate thematic framework. The data that was collected was grouped broadly into themes related to the Failed Military Coup of 1997, PME in the Zambia Army, Bridging the Gap Between the Senior and Junior Army Officers, the British Influence in the Zambia Army, Discipline/Alcoholism, Integrity, Hard Work/Career Progression, Dedication to Duty, Good Time Management, Motivation and Civil-Military Relations in Zambia.

¹²⁵ Miles and Huberman, 12.

¹²⁶ Creswell, 57.

Saturation

Questionnaires were sent to the interviewees, the data collected saturated when no more new information was found.¹²⁷ Data continued to be collected until the point of saturation was reached.¹²⁸ Saturation on this project was achieved after 70 percent of the interviewees gave similar views on the failed military coup of 1997, PME, relationship between the senior and junior Army officers, the British influence in the Zambia Army, discipline, alcoholism, integrity, hard work, career progression, dedication to duty, time management, motivation and civil-military relations in Zambia. Data saturation occurred when no new information was received from the officers who were interviewed. Charts and tables that help to define the nature of phenomena and provide explanations for the findings will be drawn in the findings and analysis chapter.¹²⁹

Summary

Data collection took much more time than initially anticipated mainly because of the long distance between the United States and Zambia where all the research participants were located. An in-depth determination as to what motivated Captain Solo to stage a military coup was not comprehensively determined as most documents that covered that topic were classified. Since this study only used unclassified data, it could not collect any classified data. However, the information that the respondents shared was sufficient to give an analysis about the failed coup and ideas on how the Zambia Army

¹²⁷ Creswell, 56.

¹²⁸ Miles and Huberman, 62.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 38.

can increase the level of professionalism among its officers. The findings and analysis of the study conducted will be discussed in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The purpose of the study was to explore what the Zambia Army can do to increase the levels of professionalism among its officers. The data that was collected from interviewees and literature review is grouped into eleven main parts and form the themes for analysis and findings: the Failed Military Coup of 1997, PME in the Zambia Army, Bridging the Gap Between the Senior and Junior Army Officers, the British Influence in the Zambia Army, Discipline/Alcoholism, Integrity, Hard Work/Career Progression, Dedication to Duty, Good Time Management, Motivation and Civil-Military Relations in Zambia.

Secondary Research Questions

The primary research question was: what can the Zambia Army do to increase the levels of education and professionalism? The following secondary questions were also relevant to draw findings and analysis:

1. What is the role of the Zambia Army?
2. How is the Army viewed by society in line with its role?
3. What can the Zambia Army do to increase the level of respect within society?
4. How do you rate the impact of alcoholism on the officers' corps?
5. How do you rate the academic performance/discipline of the current generation of young officers compared to the older generation of officers?
6. What do you think should the Zambia Army do to avoid such unprofessional conduct portrayed by Captain Solo's coup attempt?

These questions are important as they tackle the issues related to professionalism in the Zambia Army. Without sufficient consideration of such questions, it would be very difficult to ascertain the direction that the Zambia Army needs to take in its quest to increase the levels of professionalism among its officers. Some of the questions were surprising to officers. As the officers answered the questions, they realized that action was needed in order to increase the levels of professionalism in the Army.

The Failed Coup Attempt of October 1997

On 28 October 1997, the Zambian people woke up to a man named Captain Solo.¹³⁰ Captain Solo announced on the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation radio station that he had taken over the reign of the country in a military coup. The coup was thwarted by the loyal soldiers within the Zambia Army, a few hours after the announcement. The Republican President, Dr. Fredrick Chiluba continued in power and the small group of coup plotters were charged for treason. They were sentenced to varying prison terms. Captain Solo's coup incident provides a unique case on which to measure the level of professionalism of Zambia Army officers. What were the factors that led to Captain Solo's coup attempt?

Solo's concerns were rampant corruption in the Chiluba regime and that soldiers were not well looked after as was the case in the previous regime.¹³¹ The Solo group failed to rally mass support from both the Zambia Army and civilians to join the coup. Furthermore, the church and civic leaders condemned Captain Solo's coup attempt.

¹³⁰ McNail.

¹³¹ Ibid.

Although some people from certain portions of the society like the unemployed youths understood the legitimacy of Captain Solo's grievances, the whole coup process did not gain the support of senior Zambia Army officers.¹³²

In the October 1997 failed coup, swift action by the loyal and professional officers averted the coup from gaining ground and prevented loyal officers from being influenced to join the disloyal group. If the loyal forces had delayed reacting to the coup, the Solo group would have gained much ground and could have probably destabilized the Government of the Republic of Zambia. Any delay to counter the coup could have allowed the Solo group to secure important national infrastructure and strategic institutions whereby it could have been hard for the security forces to thwart their activities.¹³³

The lessons learned from the failed Solo coup suggest that there was a lapse of professionalism among the junior officers who were involved in the coup. Other lessons learned suggest that the coup was because of weak military and civilian institutions.¹³⁴ In the final analysis, Captain Solo's failed coup does not give a clear and holistic assessment on the level of professionalism for officers in the Zambia Army mainly because only a small fraction of junior officers were involved in the coup.

However, the coup exposed deficiencies in both the Zambia Army and civilian institutions. In the Army, the coup suggests that there was a break down in the chain of

¹³² Zambia Army Officer, telephone interview with author, 27 July 2014. The names of the interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement.

¹³³ Ibid.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

command whereby the junior officers were in most cases left to interact by themselves and therefore lacked proper guidance from the senior officers. It is evident that the senior Army leadership must keep their juniors well informed about the role that the Zambia Army plays in a democratic nation. The Zambia Army is one of the key institutions to uphold democratic dispensation in the country and prevent military coups.¹³⁵

The failed coup attempt by Captain Solo raised questions on the professionalism levels of institutions like the Zambia Army that are charged with a responsibility to uphold and support democratic governance. A close analysis of Solo's coup attempt suggests that professionalism in the Zambia Army is not a separate entity but it is linked to other government machinery that work together as a system to support democratic values. When professionalism levels are low in other government institutions, the Army may get affected too; if clear guidance is not made on how far the Army should intervene in national politics. Ultimately, it can be argued that strong civilian institutions and a highly effective and professional Zambia Army officer corps are needed to uphold the tenets of democracy in Zambia.¹³⁶

¹³⁵ Naison, 131.

¹³⁶ Hanania and Naison, 327.

Professional Military Education in the Zambia Army

Table 1. How to Enhance Professionalism of Officers in the Zambia Army

What needs to be done	Number of Interviewees	Percentage
Expose more officers to PME.	4	40 %
Zambia Army must teach professionalism principles at all Army schools.	1	10%
Reward hardworking officers.	1	10%
Improve working conditions of officers.	1	10%
Enhance performance appraisal system.	1	10%
Avoid favoritism of officers.	1	10%
Depoliticize the Zambia Army	1	10%

Source: Created by author using the field data.

Table 1 indicates what the interviewees felt the Zambia Army needed to do to increase the levels of professionalism of officers. The table shows that 40 percent indicated PME, 60 percent gave different ideas broken down as follows: professionalism must be taught in Army schools, improved reward system, improved working conditions,

enhanced appraisal system, favoritism of officers must be stopped, and depoliticizing of the Army.




Figure 3. How to Enhance Professionalism of Officers in Zambia Army

Source: Created by author using the field data.

Key: 1-Teach professionalism principles at all Zambia Army schools; 2-Reward hardworking officers; 3-Improve working conditions of officers; 4-Enhance performance appraisal system; 5-Avoid favoritism of officers; 6-Depoliticize the Zambia Army.

The organizational structure of the Zambia Army was inherited on Independence Day fifty years ago when the country gained independence from Britain. Since independence, the Zambia Army has grown in recruitment and in equipment holding with officers receiving PME from overseas and from local Army institutions.¹³⁷ On the local

¹³⁷ Hanania and Naison, 318.

institutions, Officer Cadets are sent to the ZMA for officers' basic training. The highest military learning institution in Zambia is the DSCSC. Field grade officers (majors and lieutenant colonels) attend the DSCSC course.

Officer Cadets undergo eighteen months of training at ZMA. The eighteen months of vigorous military training covers subjects like Minor Tactics, Counter Revolutionary Warfare, Military Law, International Studies, Military Traditions and Etiquette, Field Craft, Leadership, Map Reading, Skill at Arms (Weapon Training), Organizational Structure of the Zambia Defense Force, Voice Procedure, Driving, Swimming, Drill, Survival Training (Escape and Evasion), Roles of the Defense Force Locally and Internationally. In the final analysis, the eighteen months spent at ZMA suggests that more needs to be done in order to cover more subjects in PME. It appears that if Officer Cadets were exposed to a much longer PME at ZMA, it would greatly enhance the levels of officers' professionalism.¹³⁸

The DSCSC offers command and staff courses to majors and lieutenant colonels for a period of twelve months. Officers are trained in the art of war and are equipped with tools that enable them to operate professionally at the level of Commanding Officers and Brigade Commanders. The program also prepares officers to carry out successful planning at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. In the final analysis, the DSCSC exerts positive influence in the career progression of officers. However, the course must focus more on programs that can help to strengthen both the Zambia Army procedures and civilian institutions.

¹³⁸ Zambia Army Officer, telephone interview with author, 27 July 2014.

The Zambia Army has done a tremendous job since independence to professionalize its officer corps. The establishment of institutions like ZMA and DSCSC have greatly enhanced the professionalism of officers in the Zambia Army.¹³⁹ However, Zambia Army Doctrine needs to be upgraded on a regular basis to align it with the current trends. The Army doctrine has not been updated for a long time and additional risk is incurred by the Army through outdated and legacy technology.

The DSCSC was established in 1995, thirty-one years after Zambia gained independence. It is evident that there was over reliance on the British involvement on the affairs of Zambia. The British did not build enough infrastructure to support the professionalism of Zambian officers. It had to take Zambian officers to realize that the Army needed to build a staff college. The late identification by the senior officers to understand that they needed to establish a staff college, had an impact on the levels of professionalism of the officer corps.¹⁴⁰ From 1964 to 1995, there was no PME in Zambia for senior Army officers. Only a few privileged senior officers received PME from overseas countries between 1964 and 1995. Therefore, it can be argued that there was a gradual decline in professionalism due to natural trends until the Staff College was built.

¹³⁹ Zambia Army Officer, telephone interview with author, 27 July 2014.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

Bridging the Gap Between Senior and Junior Army Officers

Table 2. Professionalism of Locally Trained Junior Officers
Compared to Senior Officers Trained Abroad

Level of Professionalism	Number of Interviewees	Percentage
Young officers are professional	8	80 %
Young officers are less professional	2	20%

Source: Created by author using the field data.

Table 2 indicates what the interviewees viewed as the levels of professionalism of the locally trained young officers. Eighty percent of the interviewees felt the young officers were professional, despite their informal dress code. Only 20 percent said the young officers were less professional compared to older officers.



Figure 4. Professionalism of Locally Trained Junior Officers Compared to Senior Officers Trained Abroad

Source: Created by author using the field data.

There was a misconception that the current generation of junior officers in the Zambia Army who are trained at ZMA were generally viewed as less professional as compared to the senior officers who were mainly trained overseas like at Sandhurst in the UK.¹⁴¹ This study however discovered that 80 percent of the sample size believed the young officers were professional. The main difference between ZMA and the overseas Cadet Academies lies in the duration of cadet programs. At ZMA the cadet program runs for eighteen months while at West Point it is a four-year program. This thesis analyzes that the length of cadet training at ZMA is enough to train a professional officer. As was

¹⁴¹ Zambia Army Officer, telephone interview with author, 27 July 2014.

argued by Levitin that it takes 10,000 hours to get mastery in any field, the duration of officer cadet training at ZMA is more than 10,000 hours. The 10,000 hours needed to attain expertise is equivalent to approximately fourteen months and the cadets at ZMA train for eighteen months. Therefore, using Levitin's 10,000-hour concept, the graduates from ZMA are expected to gain mastery in military aspects within the provided timeframe.¹⁴²

However, in order to increase the level of professionalism, the duration of Officer Cadet training at ZMA needs to be extended if the graduates from ZMA are to compete on the levels of professionalism with their counterparts from West Point and Sandhurst. The extended program would offer ZMA an opportunity to cover more subjects in much more depth. Professionalism is about reaching an acceptable level of expertise in a particular field. The longer the officer cadets program is at ZMA, the more knowledge and experience the cadets will gain from ZMA and thereby increase the levels of professionalism of officers.¹⁴³

The study identifies that the perceived lack of professionalism among the new crop of officers was actually attributed to the changing times in history. The new young officers tend to blend well with all the latest electronic and technological gadgets. In addition, since these gadgets may sometimes be addictive, the young officers are seen mostly in their spare time browsing the internet and chatting on social media like Facebook. The study discovered that, however, such trends had no effect on the level of professionalism as it never affected any test scores for the young officers, nor did it affect

¹⁴² Levitin, 197.

¹⁴³ Zambia Army Officer, telephone interview with author, 27 July 2014.

the amount of work they produced.¹⁴⁴ Even on dress, the younger officers were dressed more like pop stars in their free time as compared to the older generation. However, that had nothing to do with the level of professionalism as the dress code being followed by the younger generation was in line with the current trends of this generation. The study also discovered that even the older generation of officers had a particular dress code that the new officers say was not so formal. However, they argue that the dressing of the older officers during their days was in line with the trends of their generation. Therefore, the older officers needed to understand that times have changed and that the earlier they adjust to the current trends the better for them.

The British Influence in the Zambia Army

The British colonization history left a rich heritage in Zambia. To this day, the Zambia Army uses British English as the official language for all Zambia Army activities and correspondences. Drills that are done in the Zambia Army were all inherited from the British. The British influence in the Zambia Army has a great impact on many aspects that the Army is facing today, ranging from professionalism of officers and equipment holding.¹⁴⁵ During colonial days, before Zambia gained independence from Britain, the Zambia Army then called the Rhodesian Regiment was established to protect British interests, which included the mineral mining rights. The Army was employed to guard the senior British officers and colonial Masters in Zambia. The British officers were answerable to the colonial Masters who made sure that those officers implemented the

¹⁴⁴ Zambia Army Officer, telephone interview with author, 27 July 2014.

¹⁴⁵ Hanania and Naison, 318.

imperialist ideas. The Zambian people fought for their independence and in 1964, the British rule in Zambia ended.

Even after 1964, British officers continued to command the Zambia Army. The last British officer to command the Zambia Army was General Ron Reid who handed over command to the first indigenous Zambian officer General Kingsley Chinkuli in 1971. It is evident to conclude that the British left Zambia in a hurry because of the running battles they fought with Zambian freedom fighters who were led by Zambia's first President Dr. Kenneth Kaunda. Because the British left Zambia in haste, they could not prepare Zambia including the Zambia Army well enough to rule themselves. Zambia had to start all over again to professionalize the Army. The Army looked to countries like China and Russia for equipment and training. It is evident that the Zambia Army has more Russian and Chinese equipment because those are the countries that helped Zambia to fight for independence and liberate other countries such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa from colonial powers.¹⁴⁶

The British Government has continued to give budgetary support to the Zambian Government and not directly to the Zambia Army. The budgetary support from the British Government is one way the former colonial power has continued to shape policy formulation in Zambia. However, the British support to the Zambia Army has not been very significant after they handed over power to indigenous Zambian officers. Countries such as China have taken over the British influence in Zambia in the past fifty years. The Chinese have built thousands of ultra-modern new houses for the military in Zambia, a task that the British failed to perform even after ruling Zambia for 164 years (from the

¹⁴⁶ Hanania and Naison, 318.

year 1800 to 1964). The Chinese Government has continued to offer scholarships to Zambia Army officers to study a broad spectrum of programs that runs from platoon level courses to master's degree programs. The British have drastically reduced sponsorship programs to Zambian officers.¹⁴⁷

Compared with other colonial Masters such as the French, the British influence and support to its former colonies such as Zambia seems to be declining. The French seem to be actively involved with their former colonies. Countries that were under the French rule continue to enjoy many scholarship programs in France compared to what the British offers to its former colonies. Professionalism in the French Army can be traced back to the Napoleonic wars and the French have continued to support their former colonies to professionalize their armies.¹⁴⁸ An example is the French built school in Benin, the Centre for Perfection Mining Action. Officers from Benin are offered scholarships to study in France and those who remain in Benin still have an opportunity to enhance their levels of professionalism by going to the French built school in Benin.

¹⁴⁷ Zambia Army Officer, telephone interview with author, 27 July 2014.

¹⁴⁸ Parker, 193.

Discipline/Alcoholism/Corruption

Table 3. Alcohol Consumption by Zambia Army Officers

Alcohol consumption	Number of Interviewees	Percentage
Officers drink too much	9	90 %
Officers drink moderately	1	10%

Source: Created by author using the field data.

Table 3 indicates the officers' views on alcoholism. The table shows that 90 percent of the interviewees felt that Zambian Army officers drink too much alcohol. Only 10 percent felt officers drank moderately.




Figure 5. Alcohol Consumption by Zambia Army Officers

Source: Created by author using the field data.

Discipline among the Zambia Army officers has always been a major topic. On the international stage, the Zambia Army is held in high esteem as having a well-trained and disciplined Army.¹⁴⁹ However, a close look into the Zambia Army officers brings out interesting findings. Junior officers like Captain Solo who attempted a military coup is one example where discipline of officers fell below the expected standard of a professional officer.

The current generation of officers has found itself entangled in the web of alcoholism. For the officers, drinking beer is a sign of maturity and a sign that you are a real officer. Drinking beer is the order of the day for some officers. Straight from work,

¹⁴⁹ Hanania and Naison, 314.

some officers do not even go home to remove the uniform; they just rush to the mess to drink some cold beers. Others go home first, change the uniform, and return to the mess later. Junior officers are encouraged to patronize the mess as part of the Army tradition in many armies the world over.¹⁵⁰ A few officers do so without resorting to beers. The officers' messes stock both alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks. However, alcohol consumption surpasses that of non-alcoholic drinks. Alcohol consumption is extremely high because it is motivated by such incentives as duty free cheap beers and officers are allowed to drink now and pay later. The facility is called Cash Held In Trust. The Cash Held In Trust facility encourages officers to drink beers even when they are broke.¹⁵¹

Some junior officers were of late involved in criminal activities such as stealing money from other officers.¹⁵² The junior officers who were implicated in stealing money from fellow officers were motivated by the desire to drink beers. Therefore, in order to finance money for alcohol consumption, getting money illegally was their last resort. The trend of officers stealing from each other is not common in the Army, but it was evident that those who participated in this vice were motivated by alcohol consumption.

To compound the alcohol related problems further, some junior officers stole a hard disc from a computer that was used to make Promotion Examinations (PROMEX).¹⁵³ Instead of studying for the exams, the officers who were implicated in such criminal acts were seen taking to alcohol most of the time, thereby never spending

¹⁵⁰ Janowitz, 202.

¹⁵¹ Zambia Army Officer, telephone interview with author, 27 July 2014.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

enough time to study for the exams. In the end, the junior officers ended up breaking into a secure office and stole a computer hard disc that contained PROMEX materials. Had the officers not taken to alcohol so much, such cases would have not happened because they could have dedicated their time to study.

If not well handled by the Zambia Army, alcohol consumption has the potential to ruin the good name that the Army has created at the international level. The duty free cheap beers that all military personnel are entitled to in Zambia seems to be promoting careless beer drinking by some elements within the Army. Beer is almost half the price compared to civilian bars. Therefore, officers tend to have many civilian friends who hope to drink cheap beers from the Army facilities. Those officers who tolerate the civilian friends who want to access cheap beers end up in a seemingly endless drinking spree after working hours.

Alcohol consumption among officers has also been linked to a high level of acquiring HIV/AIDS virus among the officers.¹⁵⁴ Drunk officers seem to have less control over their bodies resulting in liaisons with prostitutes who spread the deadly HIV/AIDS virus. The drinking habits of officers can be traced back to ZMA when the cadets are introduced to the mess facilities. If ZMA has instructors who drink too much alcohol, they end up passing that habit to cadets. Cadets in some cases are told the three Ws that make officers, i.e. Wine, Work, Women. Innocent cadets take such myths as being true and they end up practicing the three Ws after graduation. However, this study discovered that the broad picture of officer discipline had greatly improved compared to the older generation because the current officers are enlightened on human right issues

¹⁵⁴ Zambia Army Officer, telephone interview with author, 27 July 2014.

and stiff punishment given out to defaulting officers. The isolated cases of indiscipline are very rare; the majority of Zambian officers are much more disciplined now than ever before.¹⁵⁵

Corruption has not been very rampant in the Zambia Army as compared to what prevails in some African nations.¹⁵⁶ However, there are numerous complaints from the general citizenry about the recruitment process of officers. Many parents complained that their children were not selected at the Officers Selection Board because of corruption. Incidents have been recorded in Zambia where parents accuse the recruiting officers of favoring senior Army and government officials' children at the expense of well qualified ordinary applicants.¹⁵⁷ These complaints about the unfair recruitment process were also recorded in other Services like the ZAF and the ZNS.¹⁵⁸

The purported incidents of corruption during the recruitment process are deep rooted. To start with, out of the thousands of applicants across the nation, the Army only recruited less than 500 officer cadets at a time. That alone complicated the whole process. Many parents would wish to have their children employed in the Zambia Army as officers, but the economy of the nation could not employ more personnel. Therefore, the massive complaints from parents were a result of a genuine lack of slots to employ more cadets. Officers tried to be very professional during the recruitment process, but the public complained if they saw a dependent selected during the Officers Selection Board.

¹⁵⁵ Zambia Army Officer, telephone interview with author, 29 July 2014.

¹⁵⁶ Zambia Army Officer, telephone interview with author, 27 July 2014.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

The public did not know that some dependents have good qualifications. In some cases, qualifications for dependents are even better than those of non-dependents. Therefore, it is very difficult to blame officers of corruption during the Officers Selection Board when they followed legal and just selection criteria. It is hoped that when the economy and the Army grows, more new entrants would join the Army and the general citizenry would calm down at that point.¹⁵⁹

The other form of corruption commonly talked about in the Army is the perceived favoritism of officers who are related to senior Army personnel. Some officers argued that certain appointments or abroad courses were only given to officers who were closely related to some senior Army personnel. However, it is difficult to verify that assertion because all officers have opportunities of travelling abroad on courses or observer missions with the UN. Officers just need to change their mindset especially when it comes to the deployment of officers who were once dependents of Army personnel. Some of the so-called favored officers are actually very brilliant; therefore, the assertion of favoring such officers could not be taken as truth.¹⁶⁰

Integrity

Zambia Army officers are aware that integrity is a good virtue that everyone must embrace. However, not every officer is seen to uphold the trait of integrity. The works by The Goals Institute identified that trust is the foundation for all relationships.¹⁶¹ Officers

¹⁵⁹ Zambia Army Officer, telephone interview with author, 27 July 2014.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid..

¹⁶¹ The Goals Institute, *Professionalism is for Everyone*, 10.

are expected to be honest, truthful, and trustworthy if they are to qualify to be professional officers. However, incidents like that of Captain Solo undermined the moral fiber by which officers are supposed to be identified; that is being leaders of integrity.

The incident that happened at Zambia Army Headquarters where some junior officers broke into the office where examination materials were kept and stole the computer hard disc that contained classified information was a case study that reflected badly on the lack of integrity by some officers. Professional officers cannot steal no matter how attractive the items may seem to be. Those few junior officers who participated in the stealing of PROMEX materials fail the benchmark to be classified as professional officers.¹⁶² However, isolated incidents such as this one cannot be used to gauge the level of professionalism of the entire officer corps. This was the first incident of its kind. In addition, it is evident that officers who did that were driven by their own character and not what the Army has taught them to do.

The officers do understand that integrity is an important virtue that everybody across the ranks should uphold. However, it is evident that senior officers point accusing fingers that the juniors lack integrity. The junior officers also point fingers at the senior officers that they are not being truthful in that analysis. Worse still, the Army schools in Zambia do not teach professionalism principles.¹⁶³ However, what is encouraging is that both groups (senior and junior officers) agree that in order for officers to be professionals, they must strive to attain high levels of technical competence in their work

¹⁶² Zambia Army Officer, telephone interview with author, 27 July 2014.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

and uphold ethical values. This is a good starting point for both the seniors and juniors in the Zambia Army.

Hard Work/Career Progression

The Zambia Army officers know that hard work pays. From their cadet training, officers have been trained to work hard if they are to succeed in their career. Officers are taught that professionals are top performers.¹⁶⁴ Officers have been conditioned to believe that results count when it comes to career progression. When officers attend PME at ZMA and DSCSC, they are constantly reminded to place value on their academic performance. Officers in certain cases compete for first position in class. It is evident that such classroom competition is conducive to enhance professionalism among officers.

The career progression of an officer in the Zambia Army is marked by pursuing PME and other courses. Officers in the Zambia Army are expected to undergo courses such as Platoon Commanders Course or its equivalent, Junior Command and Staff Course, and the Senior Command and Staff Course. A normal career progression of an officer is expected to go through these learning processes. However, it is evident that the junior officers expressed concern that the Zambia Army was more concerned with accelerated promotions of senior officers and not junior and middle officers like captains and majors. An observation was made that an average officer stays at the rank of major for up to ten years, yet the ranks above major were generally promotable at a faster rate. This unbalanced rate of career progression seemed to put junior officers at a dilemma

¹⁶⁴ The Goals Institute, *Professionalism is for Everyone*, 48.

because even if they did every important course required for their career progression, they would still stack at the rank of major for many years.¹⁶⁵

Some junior officers confessed that they were promoted too fast from second lieutenant to lieutenant up to captain. They also observed that even senior officers are promoted too fast after reaching the rank of lieutenant colonel. Only the major's rank was seen to be the converging zone for most officers. It was evident that junior officers highlighted the fact that officers needed to be competitive if they are to make the mark of those who are promoted from the major's rank. The promotions of captains and lieutenants were not a big issue because officers could plan their career progression as they sat for PROMEX. However, after the rank of major, there is no PROMEX so the career progression becomes more competitive and unclear. In a bid to survive the competitive promotions from the rank of major, some officers have ended up losing their professional touch by scandalizing others who are seen to be potential good officers. It is evident that some disgruntled officers have ruined the careers of well-deserved hard working officers at the pretext that they paint others black hoping they would be deemed as the right officers to take the promotions or appointments.¹⁶⁶

The reward system is another context in which to look at career progression. It was discovered that some officers receive recognition only for a short-term job well done at the expense of officers who have persistently worked hard in their career.¹⁶⁷ An example is an officer who gets a good appointment because he/she has performed well at

¹⁶⁵ Zambia Army Officer, telephone interview with author, 27 July 2014.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

one course, yet another officer who has been consistent in many courses is not rewarded as such. It is such a discrepancy in the reward system that brought down the motivation of hardworking officers. Officers who have been consistent with good performance are the ones that transform their work culture into a tradition that adds value to the officer corps unlike an achiever in only one occasion.

Dedication to Duty

Officers in the Zambia Army are aware that dedication to duty is their primary responsibility.¹⁶⁸ For the officers to be dedicated to duty, they must first understand where their loyalty lies. To a Zambia Army officer, loyalty is first to the Republican President and the constitution of Zambia. The officers are also expected to be loyal to their superior officers, subordinates, and families. Dedication to duty is one virtue by which the officers' level of professionalism is gauged.¹⁶⁹

Some junior officers thought loyalty was a one-way street to the superiors. Little did they know that loyalty goes both ways, up and down. Professional officers are expected to be loyal to their co-workers in the Army and their families. Professional officers know that their loyalty is guided by their values of what is right and wrong.¹⁷⁰

When officers enlist in the Zambia Army, they are sworn to uphold the Republican constitution. Officers must be constantly reminded that it is their call of duty to stand up and defend the constitution of Zambia. Incidents like that of Captain Solo's

¹⁶⁸ Zambia Army Officer, telephone interview with author, 27 July 2014.

¹⁶⁹ Mihova, 1.

¹⁷⁰ The Goals Institute, *Professionalism is for Everyone*, 60.

failed coup attempt was a clear lapse in the life of an officer. However, an isolated event like this one cannot be used to measure the level of officers' dedication to duty. Both senior and junior officers are seen to be very dedicated to the call of duty. Professional officers are dedicated to serving their nation and that is what the majority of officers in the Zambia Army do.

Good Time Management

Officers at Zambia Army Headquarters report for work at 8:00 a.m. and leave at 5:00 p.m. Officers at other military bases report for work at 7:00 a.m. and depart at 4:00 p.m. Schools of instruction have different schedules, but work from 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. On an average, an officer is expected to put in eight hours of work per day with a one-hour lunch break. Time management by some officers has not been very good, as a few reported late for work and left early. Nevertheless, the majority of the officers are mindful of time and therefore, report for work on time and leave their offices on time.¹⁷¹

Good time management is key if the Zambia Army officers are to increase the levels of professionalism. The invention of social media such as Facebook has an impact on time management by officers especially the young ones in the Army. Some young officers are addicted to Facebook and spend too much time networking with friends during working hours.¹⁷² This is evidenced by a number of officers who update their Facebook page status during working hours. Officers who spend even five minutes

¹⁷¹ Zambia Army Officer, telephone interview with author, 27 July 2014.

¹⁷² Ibid.

checking updates on Facebook during working hours are definitely stealing Army time. Those five minutes must be utilized to do Army work and not to chat with friends.

Professional officers know how to manage time.¹⁷³ They know that they should put in eight hours of work daily, or indeed any stipulated number of working hours. Less professional officers are those who do personal things during working hours. Junior officers are in some cases not reminded of good time management skills. It is the responsibility of senior officers to mentor the juniors in good time management skills. The junior officers must be reminded that in order for them to be professional they should stop spending time on social networks during working hours. As things stand, some junior officers do not even realize that spending time on Facebook during working hours is unprofessional. Somebody within the chain of command must take responsibility to mentor the junior officers both on the dangers of social media and on techniques of good time management. These techniques may include; how to set priorities, how to make decisions, and how to allot time to those decisions made. The decisions officers make must be turned into specific management goals that are supported by the available time.¹⁷⁴

Young officers spend more time in the mess at the expense of their families. Officers must be encouraged to spend more time with their families after working hours. Officers must also be encouraged to set specific time for the gym. It is very evident that officers rarely spare time for the gym. This can be seen by the low turnout by officers at the gym after working hours. Family time and gym must be among the top priorities of

¹⁷³ The Goals Institute, *Professionalism is for Everyone*, 17.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

professional officers in their spare time. Professional officers know that time spent with their families is important as it bonds them together and ultimately the work they produce is enhanced as they are encouraged and motivated by their families. Officers must be mindful of how much time they spend in their social life.¹⁷⁵

Officers must be encouraged to make weekly plans. Professionals plan ahead. They make weekly or monthly plans with specific goals to attain with a timeframe attached to those goals. The best way officers can have an effective weekly planner is by writing down their schedule. Officers who do not plan ahead risk losing time without even realizing it. Some officers do not even know where their time goes. They only realize they have lost time when retirement time has come and they are not ready for retirement.

Professional officers spend their spare time to plan for their retirement. Officers who start early to plan for retirement have more chances of leading a successful retirement lifestyle. Time spent on planning for retirement is time well spent. Many financial advisors are available whom officers can approach on retirement plans. The golden rule to a vibrant retirement lifestyle is early planning. Professionals find time to plan for their retirement. It is encouraging to note that the current group of officers in the Zambia Army spend a little bit more time planning for retirement as compared to the older generation who were considered as never-ready for retirement.

¹⁷⁵ Janowitz, 202.

Motivation of Officers

The Zambia Army officers talk about motivation in strong terms. It is evident that the expectation of officers is that with good motivation, they are ready to do more at their place. Motivation for officers includes good conditions of service that includes things like a good paycheck, housing, medical, and family warfare.¹⁷⁶

It is evident that the officers get more incentives than the NCOs. Almost every officer from the rank of second lieutenant affords to buy a car with cash and not secure a loan. Officers are accommodated in reasonably good houses in military cantonments and for those who live outside the bases; the government pays them a housing allowance that is enough to rent a decent housing unit.¹⁷⁷

Officers and their families also have access to free medical care at all military hospitals. If the officer attends a private hospital, the medical bills incurred are reimbursed by the Army. Officers of the rank of lieutenant colonel and above are entitled to a staff car and a driver. Fuel allowance is also paid to such officers who are entitled to Army official vehicles.¹⁷⁸

Officers are also issued free uniforms that include boots, staff shoes, combat dress, and different office dress/wear. The officers are also entitled to free meals in the mess at lunchtime. Other incentives include allowances for electricity and water bills.

¹⁷⁶ Zambia Army Officer, telephone interview with author, 29 July 2014.

¹⁷⁷ Zambia Army Officer, telephone interview with author, 27 July 2014.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

These incentives have attracted many citizens of Zambia to join the military as officers.¹⁷⁹

With all these incentives that the officers get, it is expected that the officers should be well motivated, and such unprofessional conduct of Captain Solo should never arise if motivation was a huge factor in the life of a professional officer. As Janowitz argued, money does not influence a professional officer.¹⁸⁰ A professional officer in the Zambia Army must be motivated not by the most lucrative incentives, but by the duty to serve the nation even when the bank account is empty. A professional officer must not look at his paycheck in order for him to do a professional job. A professional officer must realize that it is an honor to serve mother Zambia, a call that only the loyal and dedicated folks can answer. It is true that good condition of service can boost the morale of officers, but ultimately a true professional must be motivated by his ability to answer to the national call when his services are needed despite the prevailing economic factors. Raising salaries as a way to motivate the officers may sound like a good strategy, but ultimately, when officers are motivated by monetary gains, it dilutes the very moral fiber of which the officers are supposed to be made. That is the ability to serve others from deep down in their hearts. The military tradition has always hinged on the ability of officers to serve the nation first to the best of their ability; all other things must come later.

¹⁷⁹ Zambia Army Officer, telephone interview with author, 27 July 2014.

¹⁸⁰ Janowitz, 422.

Civil-Military Relations in Zambia

The study of civil-military relations in Zambia can best be analyzed by relating to theories that exist in civil-military relations. Huntington and Janowitz extensively dealt with the subject of civil-military relations. The two researchers came up with two opposing theories. Huntington argued that if officers are to be professional, they needed to keep away from politics and just concentrate on military tasks.¹⁸¹ On the other hand, Janowitz argued that if officers are to be professional, they needed to participate in politics because it was difficult to separate tasks that are military and political.¹⁸²

In the Zambia Army, officers are urged to keep away from politics if they are to be called professional officers.¹⁸³ It is evident that the Zambian system supports the Huntington theory that suggests that officers must concentrate on military tasks and politicians must have total control over the military. Officers who participate in partisan politics are encouraged to retire from the Army. For officers like Captain Solo who wanted to seize power from politicians, they are charged with treason and flushed out of the Army.

Since Zambia gained independence from Britain in 1964, the Zambia Army has operated in different governmental systems. During the period 1964 to 1973, the country adopted a multiparty system of governance. From 1973 to 1991, the country adopted a single party system of governance. During the single party system of governance, officers were even appointed to political positions such as district governance. It is evident that

¹⁸¹ Huntington, 121.

¹⁸² Janowitz, 10.

¹⁸³ Zambia Army Officer, telephone interview with author, 27 July 2014.

during the single party rule, the government then adopted the Janowitz theory which states that officers can still participate in the politics of the nation as military and political tasks are difficult to separate.

From 1991 to date, Zambia has adopted a multiparty system of governance and officers are expected to remain neutral and never to participate in partisan politics. It is evident that the civil-military relation Zambia is currently embracing is that which was championed by Huntington. What is more interesting about the Zambian system is that even if officers are not allowed to participate in politics, all Service Chiefs are appointed by the President who is a politician. Furthermore, the Service Chiefs, like the Zambia Army Commander and the Zambia Air Force Commander, have a direct link to the President. Therefore, it is incumbent upon themselves as Service Chiefs to draw a demarcating line between politics and military in their execution of duties.

It is interesting to discover that a young country like Zambia has experimented with opposing theories in civil-military relations. What is more fascinating about the Zambian system is that, despite the changing political systems, the Zambia Army remained steadfast and maintained a high level of professionalism.¹⁸⁴

Summary

Chapter 4 presented the findings and analysis of this study. The findings and analysis have been grouped into eleven common themes; an in-depth analysis of the failed military coup of 1997, a look into PME available in Zambia, the legacy and influence of Britain in the Zambia Army, issues of discipline and alcoholism by Zambian

¹⁸⁴ Hanania and Naison, 320.

officers, integrity of officers, hard work, and career progression of officers, officers' dedication to duty, time management, motivation, and the concepts followed in civil-military relations in Zambia.

The next chapter addresses the conclusions and recommendations. From the findings and analysis made in the previous chapters, conclusions will be drawn and recommendations will be made on how the Zambia Army can increase the levels of education and professionalism.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The previous chapter discovered many issues related to the levels of professionalism of Zambian officers such as the analysis of the failed 1997 military coup, influence of the British legacy, discipline, integrity, dedication to duty, alcoholism, alleged corruption, motivation, career progression, and the civil-military relations in Zambia. The previous chapter is important because it lays a foundation on which conclusions and recommendations are hereby made. The following are some pertinent summaries of what this study discovered.

Conclusions

Working with professionals from the US Army Command and General Staff College, was a pleasure. This study was guided by truly exemplary professionals who comprised the thesis committee. The researcher had to measure up to their levels in terms of accuracy and authority of the statements made, time management, ethics, and procedures in research. It was evident during the research that, in the US Army, emphasis was put on professionalism by conducting leader education and leader development programs. Emphasis is put on the need to uphold ethics and values that befit a professional officer. The US Army established the US Army Command and General Staff College in 1881 to professionalize the officer corps. The US military system offers the Zambia Army a glimpse of the route it should take to enhance professionalism of its officer corps in today's changing environment.

This study began with a conception that locally trained junior officers in the Zambia Army were not very professional compared to senior officers who were trained overseas. However, this study discovered that the current generation of young officers are professional even when they dress like pop stars. The current dress code of junior officers affected neither the work they produced nor test scores at schools. The change in the way officers dressed had more to do with the change of time and had nothing to do with professionalism as the young officers still performed their duties to the best of their abilities. It was a misconception that professionalism was on a decline in the Zambia Army just by looking at the way the junior officers dressed. Eighty percent of the interviewees said the young officers were professional.

The study discovered that the establishment of ZMA and DSCSC enhanced the levels of professionalism of officers. Officer Cadets that are trained at ZMA for eighteen months have an opportunity to gain the necessary skills needed in professional officers. The study identified that, according to Levitin, it requires 10,000 hours for somebody to gain expertise in their job. The 10,000 hours needed to reach expertise equates to fourteen months, but if non-working hours and holidays are factored in, that duration may go up to three years. At ZMA training is seven days a week. Therefore, the eighteen months cadets train at ZMA was enough for them to become professional officers. However, after non-working hours and breaks are factored in, an increase from eighteen months training would be ideal. An increase from eighteen months upwards would be needed to increase the levels of professionalism.

The study also discovered that there was a late realization by the Zambian Army leadership of the need to establish a Zambian Staff College. It took the country thirty-one

years after gaining independence to establish DSCSC in 1995. The late realization meant that senior officers who had no opportunity of going overseas for PME could not increase their level of military education.

The study also identified alcohol as the main problem that affected the current generation of young officers in the Zambia Army. Ninety percent of the interviewees acknowledged that alcohol consumption was too high among officers. There was a notion by junior officers that the officers who drank more were the real officers. Officers have access to cheap subsidized beers and such facilities only helped to make officers drink more. The reduced price of beer in officers' messes was an enabler for high alcohol consumption by officers. The Army needed to uphold the values and culture of drinking less. Most officers started drinking while at the military academy because some instructors at ZMA taught cadets that officers must embrace the three Ws, i.e. Work, Wine and Women. Teaching such fallacies to cadets needed to come to an end if the Army was to resolve its current problems of excessive alcohol consumption.

This study also identified that professionalism skills were not taught in either high schools or colleges in Zambia. Even ZMA did not teach the skills of professionalism as part of its curricula. Therefore, when officer cadets join the Army, the subject of professionalism seems to be new. To increase the levels of professionalism of officers, it would be important that institutions like ZMA introduce professionalism as a subject. Junior officers not only become professional by watching the senior officers who are generally viewed to be very professional. The junior officers must be trained in the skills of professionalism, and then the Zambia Army will have a professional officer corps.

This study also discovered that the British influence in Zambia spanned a total period of 164 years (from the year 1800 to 1964 when Zambia gained independence). The British influence continues to be felt in the Zambia Army because even English is used as the official language in the Army and all the drills are inherited from the British style. However, it was further discovered that the British influence had declined over the years. The Chinese influence was more pronounced in the Zambia Army as more construction projects have been done by the Chinese compared to the British. Additionally, more officers continued to receive PME from China compared to the numbers of officers who go to the UK.

This study also revealed that the failed military coup of 1997 by Captain Solo could not be used to holistically judge the level of professionalism of officers, because the few officers who participated in the coup had their own personal motivations. Hence, the coup plotters never received any support either from senior Army officers or from the general citizenry. However, it was evident that the coup showed a break down in the chain of command, whereby in most cases, the junior officers were left to interact by themselves thereby, they lacked proper guidance from senior officers.

The study further discovered that the Zambia Army officers do understand their role in a democratic nation. They know as professional officers, they have to support democratic values, human rights, and acknowledge their subordination to civilian control. Officers have no problems working under the control of civilians like the Republican President and the Minister of Defense who are in charge of the military. It was evident that the majority of the officers have integrity, they are well disciplined, portrayed ethical

behavior, dedicated to duty, and are motivated by the good conditions of service provided by the Government of the Republic of Zambia.

The study identified traits that the Zambian officers need to embrace in order to enhance their levels of professionalism. The officers must be good at time management, they must keep a good bearing, and officers must be experts in their different corps because the word professional actually points to a person who is an expert in their field. The officers must keep themselves updated with the knowledge of their corps and international security concerns. When given tasks, officers are expected to perform to the expectations of their superiors; if anything the officers must do more than what duty demands them to do. Professional officers are expected to be performers and deliver whatever they promise they would do. Professional officers are further expected to use effective communication skills when dealing with both superiors and subordinates. The officers' loyalty to the President of Zambia, the Republican constitution, to superiors and subordinates must be unquestionable. It is further expected that professional Zambian officers must share the knowledge they gained from their PME with co-workers. Officers have the necessary knowledge gained from ZMA, DSCSC and other institutions of higher learning, from both local and abroad. Therefore, it would be prudent as professional officers to share their experience and knowledge with fellow combatants in the Zambia Army.

From the time Zambia gained independence from Britain in 1964, the Zambia Army has exercised two opposing theories of civil-military relations. Huntington's theory that states that professional officers must not participate in politics is the current civil-military relations concept being used in Zambia. The Zambia Army also practiced the

Janowitz theory that states that professional officers can participate in politics because the demarcating line between military and political tasks is difficult to draw. During the period between 1973 and 1991, Zambia embraced a theory where even Army officers were given political appointments such as District Governors. The change in the political landscape never affected the performance of the Zambia Army officers. Therefore, it proves that Huntington's and Janowitz's theories can be implemented and officers can still remain professional in which ever of the two civil-military relations theory the government adopts. In the case of Zambia, both theories worked at different intervals in Zambia's fifty-year history.

Recommendations

An examination of professionalism of the Zambia Army officers revealed that most officers (80 percent) are professional but the Zambia Army can do the following in order to increase the levels of education and professionalism. The Zambia Army must reconsider increasing the duration of officer cadet training at ZMA from eighteen months to at least thirty-six months or more. Once this is done, the graduates from ZMA will have an opportunity to gain expertise in many fields of the Army that cannot be learned within the current schedule. Subjects that can be introduced after increasing the training duration may include: Strategic Management, Economics, Regional and International Peace and Security Systems, Principles or Guidelines of Professionalism, and the International Humanitarian Law, in addition to the current traditional military courses offered. An increase in the cadet program would also pave the way for cadets to graduate with either an advanced diploma or degree in PME. Once this is implemented, it would greatly enhance the levels of professionalism of officers in the Zambia Army.

ZMA must be affiliated with Mulungushi University. Mulungushi University is co-located in the same town as ZMA in Kabwe. A Memorandum of Understanding must be drawn between the university and ZMA so that degree programs are introduced at the academy. The faculty from the university could be allocated time in which they could teach special subjects such as Strategic Management, Regional, International Peace and Security Systems, Economics and International Humanitarian Law. At the end of eighteen months initial training, the cadets can either be sent to Mulungushi University for another eighteen months or the lecturers from the university could take up the lessons at ZMA for the last part of cadet program. Affiliating ZMA with Mulungushi University would augment the technical and tactical skills offered at ZMA with knowledge in humanities offered at the university. Ultimately, this joint program would enhance the levels of professionalism of officers.

ZMA must introduce Professionalism as a subject. From kindergarten, right through to high school and universities, professionalism skills are not taught to students in Zambia. Therefore, it becomes difficult for officers to grasp the whole concept of professionalism if it is not taught to them during/from the basic training. By watching boxing, you do not become a boxer. You have to be trained. Similarly watching other professional officers will not make junior officers professional. They need to be trained and educated in professionalism. The Zambia Army must teach the principles of professionalism in all Army schools. It is not enough to assume that officers know what it means to be professional; the officers must be taught professionalism practices even at the Zambian Staff College.

The Zambia Army must introduce a comprehensive professional code of conduct for officers. Such a document must cover the expected standards that professional officers must uphold. The document must tabulate the values and traditions that must be upheld by professional officers. The document should also go deeper and look at the role the Zambian culture plays in changing behavior. This working document must give specific guidelines to issues of time management, character, attitude, competence, skills, integrity, trust, commitment to duty, civil-military relations (officers' relationships with civilians), ethics that officers must observe, officers' roles in supporting the chain of command, officers' accountability, officers' bearing and dress, respect of others and guidelines to doing the right things.

The Zambia Army must design a doctrine that should give a statement of the role, mission, strategy, goals, and responsibilities of each corps in the Zambia Army, in line with the current environment when the world has become a global village. The new doctrine must not only cover the procedures and techniques of how the Army will fight, but should also address the Army's responsibility to Government of the Republic of Zambia. The New Doctrine must be taught in all Army schools from basic training schools like ZMA right through to DSCSC. Government leaders must also be updated on the New Doctrine in order to strengthen the civil-military relations. Once the New Doctrine has been designed, a new formal PME and training system must be adopted by the Zambia Army to conform to the New Doctrine. All troops and cadets must be trained and taught the New Doctrine that addresses how the Zambia Army will fight in the current environment that is faced with highbrid threats.

The Zambia Army, in conjunction with the ZAF and ZNS, must design a Joint Doctrine. The days when the Army used to fight alone are long gone. A Joint Doctrine for the Zambian military will help to streamline all the operating procedures and enhance the joint capabilities of the three Services that make up the Zambia Defense Force. Furthermore, a Joint Doctrine will enhance professionalism, as officers will have a working document that enables them to work closely and professionally with officers from other Services during joint operations. The Joint Doctrine must specify the roles and responsibilities that each Service must play in a joint arena.

Career progression of officers must be streamlined. The Zambia Army must draw up a straightforward career progression path for its officers. The Army must put in place a straightforward system for selecting officers for PME both locally and abroad. The Army may consider selecting officers who perform extremely well at the Zambian Staff College for further PME in developed countries like the United States, Germany, the UK, etc. For instance, the officer who is the best student at the Zambian Staff College must be sent to the US Army Command and General Staff College, the second officer to the Victorian Staff College in the UK; in that order, for comparative study. Once implemented, such a straightforward system would encourage officers to do better at the Zambian Staff College; it would also draw a clear career progression path for officers.

The Army also needs to develop clear promotion structures and procedures for officers of the ranks of major and above. The procedure for captains and below is effective as the junior officers sit for PROMEX. Once they pass those examinations, they are promoted, that is not the case with majors and above. Therefore, standards must be put in place to specify when one is due for promotion from major to the next rank in that

order. These standards may consider things like the level of PME or years an officer has to serve at one rank. Other considerations like the availability of vacancies or appointments, discipline, and work production for senior ranks can still be considered, in addition to the basic standards for an officer to qualify for promotion.

The DSCSC must adjust its curriculum to suit the current environment. The college should consider re-introducing the military history package and ethics to its programs. Emphasis in military history must be placed on Zambia Army history. The Zambia Army has a rich history, but very little has been documented. Furthermore, the college may consider dividing both the Army and Air Wings into departments. These departments may include the Department of Strategy, the Department of Tactics, the Department of History, the Department of International Security and Peacekeeping Operations/Joint Operations, the Department of Logistics, the Department of Ethics and Military Law, the Department of Leadership, the Department of Research and the Department of Doctrine. These departments must be headed by experts in those fields. Once this was done, it would streamline many procedures at the college and make life much easier for students to know whom exactly they should approach for particular questions or clarifications. The college must also speed up its modernization and computerization programs to move at the same pace like other well-established colleges in terms of modern technology.

The Zambia Army must push for a versatile curriculum at DSCSC. The formulation of the Department of Leadership or Department of Leader Development must be take center stage at DSCSC. The Zambian Staff College must educate officers (the Army Leaders) on how to lead an organization like the Army. The objective of the

Leadership Department would be to impart leadership skills in officers so that they can be effective organizational level leaders. The department should be entrusted to design the Zambia Army Leadership Development Strategy. Graduates from DSCSC must have knowledge in the concepts and models of how to lead change in organizations. Once this department is activated, it would make officers understand the process involved in creating a vision and strategy of how best to run Army units.

In order to accommodate these new subjects in the already fully packed DSCSC curriculum, DSCSC may consider downgrading much of the Staff Duties package to the Junior Command course. This would create room for more versatile and much needed leadership topics. Furthermore, the duration and content of some of the exercises conducted at DSCSC could be modified to create room for new subjects.

To address the high alcohol consumption by officers, the Zambia Army leadership must take a leading role to deglamorize alcohol. There was need to push for a cultural change in the area of beer drinking. It was evident that some instructors at ZMA glamorize beer and cadets end up growing in the ranks as officers who glamorize beer. Facilities and incentives such as Cash Held in Trust and cheap duty free beers all contributed to the high levels of beer consumption among officers. The high levels of alcohol consumption contributed too many notable disciplinary and health issues in the Army. Therefore, something needed to be done especially to deglamorize alcohol at ZMA during cadet training. Instructors at ZMA must be given clear instructions on how to deglamorize alcohol.

Additional Recommendations for Future Study

This study only looked at professionalism of officers in the Zambia Army. It is recommended that further study needs to be carried out on professionalism of NCOs in the Zambia Army. Due to the time factor, this study could not cover the professionalism issues related to NCOs. An examination of professionalism of NCOs in the Zambia Army would give a holistic view of professionalism of the majority of the personnel in the Zambia Army, as NCOs form the bulk of personnel as compared to officers. The study may consider analyzing the educational and training system of the NCOs in the Zambia Army. If possible, such a study must recommend that the Zambia Army consider establishing a college for NCOs that is almost at the same level with the Zambian Staff College. This would avoid a situation where officers have the necessary PME and their NCOs do not have a similar PME. The gap in the military knowledge between officers and NCOs needs to be reduced. This is only possible if the Army established a higher college for NCOs.

APPENDIX A

CONSENT AND USE AGREEMENT FOR ORAL HISTORY MATERIALS

You have the right to choose whether or not you will participate in this oral history interview, and once you begin you may cease participating at any time without penalty. The anticipated risk to you in participating is negligible and no direct personal benefit has been offered for your participation. If you have questions about this research study, please contact the student at: _____ or Dr. Robert F. Baumann, Director of Graduate Degree Programs, at (913) 684-2742.

To: Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Room 4508, Lewis & Clark Center
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

1. I, _____, participated in an oral history interview conducted by
_____, a graduate student in the Master of Military Art and Science

Degree Program, on the following date [s]: _____ concerning the following topic:

_____.

2. I understand that the recording [s] and any transcript resulting from this oral history will belong to the U.S. Government to be used in any manner deemed in the best interests of the Command and General Staff College or the U.S. Army, in accordance with guidelines posted by the Director, Graduate Degree Programs and the Center for Military History. I also understand that subject to security classification restrictions I will be provided with a copy of the recording for my professional records. In addition, prior to the publication of any complete edited transcript of this oral history, I will be afforded an opportunity to verify its accuracy.

3. I hereby expressly and voluntarily relinquish all rights and interests in the recording [s] with the following caveat:

_____ None _____ Other: _____

I understand that my participation in this oral history interview is voluntary and I may stop participating at any time without explanation or penalty. I understand that the tapes and transcripts resulting from this oral history may be subject to the Freedom of Information Act, and therefore, may be releasable to the public contrary to my wishes. I further understand that, within the limits of the law, the U.S. Army will attempt to honor the restrictions I have requested to be placed on these materials.

Name of Interviewee	Signature	Date
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Accepted on Behalf of the Army by	Date
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